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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Posner wrote in 1986 that the law and economics movement is
"perhaps the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter
century."' Through its application of economic theories and methodologies
to legal issues, this movement has revolutionized our understanding of many
areas of common law and statutory regulation. Curiously, however, the law
and economics revolution has, with few exceptions, bypassed international
law,2 perhaps for some of the same reasons that realist political scientists
ignore international law, or perhaps because of a concern that economic
analysis is somehow less useful in the international context than in the
domestic context. The purpose of this Article is to begin an inquiry into the
actual and potential application of law and economics to international law.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW xix (3d ed. 1986).
2. But see ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997) (offering a collection of articles that
approach international law topics from a law and economics perspective) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS]. In particular, see Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International Law, in
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, supra, at 1. In the Appendix, we provide a selected bibliography of articles
using economic approaches to international legal issues.
Economic Analysis of International Law
With the rejection of both natural law theory and state-centered
positivism as sources of theory for international law, international lawyers
seek both theory and methodology.3 As a result, international legal
scholarship too often combines careful doctrinal description-here is what
the law is-with unfounded prescription-here is what the law should be.
This scholarship often lacks any persuasively articulated connection between
description and prescription, undermining the prescription. International
legal scholarship lacks a progressive research program.4
In response, several international law scholars have turned to other
disciplines. Some, such as Kenneth Abbott and Anne-Marie Slaughter, have
led the way into international political theory, including international
political economy, and have begun a thoughtful arbitrage.5 At the same time,
the international political scientists were engaged in their own rationalist
arbitrage, borrowing from various components of economic theory and game
theory. While there are valuable tools to be borrowed from political
scientists, our focus here is on the rationalist tools that are largely borrowed
from economics, and, in several cases, from law and economics.
Economics is the study of rational choice. As such, it plays a leading
role in evaluating the effects of rational maximizing behavior under
conditions of scarcity. Economics enjoys an advantage over other disciplines
in rationality-based analysis, simply because this analysis is central to
economics, and economics has developed this analysis extensively. The
development has largely been in the mathematical realm, the so-called
"blackboard economics." However, at this point in the development of
economics-and of international law-the more mathematical models do not
yet seem to engage the core issues of international law. Economics as
practiced by lawyer-economists often involves complex cost-benefit
analyses. This approach is often useful, but has important limitations due to
problems of administrability, commensurability, and interpersonal
comparison of utility.
3. For one account of this search, see Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (charting the
emerging connections between international law and two schools in political science, Institutionalism
and Liberalism).
4. For more on the meaning of a "progressive research program," see infra text
accompanying notes 163-164. See also Inre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes, in CRITIcIsM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91 (Ire Lakatos & Alan
Musgrave eds., 1970); Jason S. Johnston, Law, Economics and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 L. &
Soc'y Rv. 1217 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) (outlining the major strands of international
relations theory and suggesting their relevance for international law); Slaughter Burley, supra note 3;
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation
of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998) (reviewing recent uses of international
relations theory in international law scholarship and proposing an agenda for the integration of the two
disciplines).
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However, the more promising economic methodologies, in terms of
their capacity to generate a progressive research program that might usefully
address persistent international law problems, may not be those that teach us
to balance the costs and benefits of any particular policy, but rather those
that focus on the balancers: international institutions (including the general
international legal system).6 Indeed, the threshold issue in many, if not all,
international legal problems is that of institutional choice. What institution-
market, domestic legislature, adjudicatory body, or international rule-
making body-ought to decide, for example, if one state's intellectual
property standards are too low, or another's environmental standards are too
high? The answers to questions like these ought to be informed by an
understanding of the relative institutional competencies and capacities of the
various alternatives, as well as by an appreciation of the strategic
interactions among the various institutions.
We believe that economic analysis may be able to shed substantial light
on precisely these sorts of inquiries. Significantly, this form of analysis is
not limited to questions of wealth maximization. As we note below, if
economic analysis were limited to wealth maximization, this would be
reason alone to reject, or at least sharply limit the domain of, the economic
analysis of law.7 In fact, the extension of economic analysis to fields beyond
traditional markets requires economics to revise its approach to include the
maximization of additional values, or, more accurately, to include the
maximization of multiple values simultaneously.
To develop this thesis, this Article proceeds in seven parts. In Part II,
we identify three reasons why international lawyers have not, to date,
extensively used economic analysis, and demonstrate that none of these
reasons is persuasive. This "negative" argument does not, of course,
establish that international lawyers should use economic analysis. In Part III,
we provide a reason to believe that economic analysis will enrich our
understanding of international law by outlining the analogy between the
market of international relations and the traditional markets for goods. While
others have alluded to this analogy before, we provide a typology of the
ways in which "transactions" in international relations resemble market
interactions.
6. By institutions, we mean not only organizations such as the United Nations or the
European Union, but also treaty structures and other non-organizational structures that constrain
future behavior. The essence of an institution is that it constrains future behavior; an organization is
an institution that actually takes action over time. See, e.g., Elias L. Khalil, Organizations Versus
Institutions, 151 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 445 (1995) (distinguishing organizations which, the
author argues, are agents with preferences and objectives, from institutions, which amount to social
constraints).
7. See infra Sections ll.B, VII.B, Vn.C.
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Those who reject the analogy between international relations and
private markets need not reject the economic analysis of international law. In
the next three Parts of the Article, we test the hypothesis that economic
analysis will be useful in understanding international law topics that are
similar to domestic law topics where economic analysis has been fruitful.
Thus, Parts IV, V, and VI explore the applicability of economic analysis to
three important international law topics: the allocation of prescriptive
jurisdiction, the law of treaties, and the competences of international
organizations. In each Part, we analogize the international legal issue to a
domestic legal issue, and then explore whether the economic methodologies
that have been useful domestically can also be used on the international
plane. In Part IV, we outline an analogy between prescriptive jurisdiction
and property, and then apply transaction cost economics and economic
analysis regarding the design and protection of entitlements to jurisdictional
issues. In Part V, we outline the analogy between treaties and contracts, and
explore whether the efficient breach hypothesis and the game theoretic
analysis of default rules can illuminate our understanding of treaty law. In
Part VI, we analogize international organizations to business firms and
examine whether the theory of the firm can inform current debates over
international organizations. To anticipate our conclusions, we will identify
certain methodologies included in the new institutional economics and in the
public choice branch of economics, such as game theory and transaction cost
economics, as having greater promise than other economic approaches,
including price theory used without reference to transaction costs or strategic
considerations.
Like all theoretical approaches, economic analysis has its limitations.
In Part VII, we outline some of the problems associated with this type of
analysis. Some of these problems are also present, although not as starkly,
in the economic analysis of domestic law. Other difficulties arise from the
particular features of the international legal system. We believe that our
identification of these difficulties can inform a research agenda to further our
understanding of the appropriate domain of economic analysis of law.'
Finally, in Part VIII, we briefly set forth some ideas about a future
research program. We also provide, in an Appendix, a bibliography of
literature that uses economic tools to analyze international legal issues.
We emphasize that our analysis and examples are intended to be
illustrative and suggestive rather than exhaustive. We by no means attempt
to explore every international legal issue that can be informed by economic
analysis, nor do we attempt to apply every possible economic methodology
8. In other words, we do not simply treat law and economics (L&E) as a source of theory
that international law can passively accept. Rather, we see the intellectual arbitrage as potentially
running in both directions and believe that international law can inform our understanding of L&E.
See Slaughter et al., supra note 5, at 379 (showing that international lawyers use international
relations theory to help explain international law, and use international law to help explain
international relations theory).
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to the international legal problems we do address. Instead, this Article
represents an "invitation": we hope to stimulate a series of inquiries into the
utility of different forms of economic analysis in evaluating a variety of
international legal norms and institutions, and, in so doing, to enrich
international legal discourse and scholarship.
II. WHY HAVE INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AVOIDED LAW AND
ECONOMICS?
While there may be many explanations for why international legal
scholars have not participated in the law and economics (L&E) revolution,
we believe that many international lawyers would identify at least one of the
following three concerns: (1) L&E's seemingly inaccessible methodologies;
(2) L&E's supposedly conservative political prejudices; and (3) L&E's
positivism and its presumed denigration of international law. However, we
believe that each of these concerns rests upon a misunderstanding of relevant
law and economics methodologies. In this Part, we attempt to clear up the
confusion underlying each of these objections, and to explain why they
provide no rationale for declining to investigate whether L&E methodologies
can illuminate international legal problems.9
A. Inaccessible Methodologies
As George Stigler explains '° , there are two roles that economics can
play in law. The first, traditional, role of economics is to answer particular
questions." For example, economics can speak to the question of market
definition in antitrust or antidumping, or to the question of whether two
products are "like," with the result that discrimination between them is
prohibited, 2 by reference to cross-elasticities of demand. In this first role,
economic analysis supplies inputs to a legal rule, and we might refer to this
role as "economic analysis in law." This role, which requires the full tools
of the professional economist, and can be undertaken without any help from
lawyers, is not the focus of this Article.
9. In Part VII, infra, we identify more serious difficulties associated with the economic
analysis of international legal issues.
10. See George Stigler, Law or Economics, 35 J.L. & ECON. 455, 467 (1992).
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. I, IV GATT
B.I.S.D. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The GATT 1947 is incorporated into the GATT 1994,
which was adopted with the founding of the WTO. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. l(a), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, THE REsULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE
LEGAL TEXTS 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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"A second, more controversial role for economics is in the study of
legal institutions and doctrines."13 This is "economic analysis of law," and is
the domain we explore below.
Many of us are uncomfortable with economics, both because we
distrust its theory and methodology, and, more embarrassingly, because we
are uncertain that we have the quantitative or other skills needed to use these
tools. Complex graphs, charts, and multivariable equations may deter those
trained in the law from employing economic analysis. These tools, however,
are not necessary for all types of economic analysis of law and, in fact, the
highly mathematical formal analysis that economists often use has, to date,
shed little light on the issues that most interest international lawyers. Many
of the most relevant and useful tools of analysis for our issues do not require
great mathematical skill.14
For example, international legal scholars should find few obstacles to
the use of the new institutional economics. I5 New institutional economics
seeks to integrate neoclassical economics, which has concentrated on the
workings of the price system (in fields amenable to pricing), with
institutional analysis. Institutions, including both organizations and legal
rules, are by definition entities that make or constrain decisions outside the
formal price mechanism.16 In order to study institutions, it is necessary to
add consideration of transaction costs and of the effects of strategic behavior
(game theory); both are areas with which international lawyers are already
familiar.
In brief, the new institutional economics incorporates price theory,
transaction cost economizing, and game theory. 7 It incorporates, and is also
incorporated in, economic analysis of property rights," public choice
theory, 9 and positive political economy.2" A primary tool of this approach is
comparative institutional analysis21-a form of analysis already at the heart
13. Stigler, supra note 10, at 467; see also Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of
Lav: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence, 68 PRoc. BRrr. ACAD. (1982) (discussing the
increasing attacks on the application of economics to the study of law).
14. We do not mean to overstate this point: in many contexts, "blackboard economics"
provides important insights into problems. To avoid it simply because we do not understand it would
be as ignorant as to avoid important scholarship or primary materials simply because they are
published in another language.
15. "Modem institutional economics is economics as it ought to be." Ronald Coase, The
New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INsT. & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 231 (1984).
16. See supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. INT. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986).
18. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997).
19. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989); MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997).
20. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
21. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the central need for the analysis of
institutional choice in economics and policy); Coase, supra note 15, at 229; Bruno S. Frey,
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of much international legal scholarship. In fact, like Molire's Bourgeois
Gentilhomme, international lawyers may find, to their surprise, that they
have always spoken new institutional economics, because one of the
lawyer's principal tools of analysis is comparison. On the other hand, we
would not be writing this Article if we did not feel that the new institutional
economics offers substantial counterintuitive insights.
B. Political Prejudices and the Subordination of Noneconomic Values
Much criticism of economic analysis on the domestic level focuses on
the alleged political biases inherent in this form of analysis.22 Thus, critics
have objected to economists' alleged commitment to laissez-faire economic
policy, or supposed ideological allegiance to libertarian or conservative
political positions. Stated most bluntly, economic analysis is often dismissed
as providing an ideological justification for the unconsidered rejection of
government intervention.
Similarly, economic analysis may be rejected for its supposed elevation
of the market, and the economic values that are maximized in market
settings, at the expense of other important values. This argument would
suggest that economic analysis cannot adequately account for difficult-to-
quantify or incommensurable social values, and necessarily devalues or
subordinates those values to economic values.23
Again, however, we believe that these related objections do not fatally
undermine efforts to apply all L&E methodologies to international legal
issues. First, the methodologies that we find most promising do not have a
"bias" against government regulation and/or in favor of the market. Rather,
the methodologies we focus on accept the potential validity-both the
Institutions Matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 443 (1990)
(highlighting interactions between economics and institutions and their importance for economic
theory); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 EcoN.
INQUIRY 419 (1987) (exploring the historical obstacles to economic growth in the context of the
political/economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs);
North, supra note 17 (explaining that theory can be used to integrate neoclassical theory with an
analysis of the way institutions modify choice); Oliver Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SC. Q. 219 (1994)
(combining institutional economics with contract law and organization theory to differentiate different
forms of economic organization).
22. Scholars from across the political spectrum share this view. See, e.g., George J. Stigler,
The Politics of Political Economists, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EcONOMIcs 51, 52 (1965) ("[T]he
professional study of economics makes one politically conservative."); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 905 (1980) (discussing the tendency of
economic analysis to produce politically conservative views). We understand this to be a claim that
economists tend to support decentralized markets over other institutions. See Russell Hardin, Magic
on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1987, 2014 (1996). As explained more
fully in the text, we think this charge of conservative bias cannot fairly be leveled against the
methodologies we find most promising.
23. We address the problems associated with incommensurability in Section VII.C, infra.
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legitimacy and the efficiency-of government processes.24 Contrary to the
claims of the critics, in the methodologies upon which we focus "neither
market nor nonmarket forms of organization are primary."25 Instead, under
this understanding, legislation-no less than the market-is a mechanism for
preference revelation; however, both the market and the law (the state) are
imperfect as such mechanisms.26 The methodologies we explore take as
central (and open) the question of which "institution," including potentially
the market, ought to be used in any particular context.
To be sure, the governmental processes that might be used are not
necessarily efficient in monetary or monetized terms: they might not pass a
cost-benefit analysis that has regard only for monetary or monetized
benefits. But this cannot be the measure of validity, as there are many values
that are not readily monetizable but that are still worthy of expression, either
in private conduct or in political action.27 They are also worthy of being
traded for monetary or monetized values, and such "trade" is presumptively
efficient. We emphasize these points to reach out to those who reject law
and economics as politically doctrinaire or ignorant of non-monetized
values, and we argue that any dogma or ignorance is a political prejudice
that is not necessitated by economic analysis itself.
While we believe, as explained below, that L&E analysis has much to
say about questions of institutional choice, the actual decisions are, of
course, made through political processes. It is in this sense that politics is
the leading mechanism, as it still retains kompetenz-kompetenz to determine
the border between its domain and that of the market, and the methods we
examine do not question this priority of the political over the economic.
C. Positivism and the Denigration of International Law
A fundamental tenet of law and economics is its positivism, meaning
its emphasis on empiricism and analysis of the world as it is, as opposed to a
"normative" perspective of the world as it should be. The line between
positive and normative economics is frequently unclear, as positive analysis
is frequently motivated by or used to support a normative critique.28 While
24. See DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995) (challenging
conventional public choice arguments regarding the failure of political markets).
25. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1214 (1991).
26. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 21.
27. "Maximum national income, however, is not the only goal of our nation, as judged by
policies adopted by our government-and government's goals as revealed by actual practice are more
authoritative than those pronounced by professors of law or economics." Stigler, supra note 10, at
459; see also AVINASH DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
PERSPECTIVE 147 (1996) (discussing the legitimacy of noneconomic goals).
28. See Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1565
(1995). Indeed, many deny a strong distinction between positive and normative discourse, arguing that
a strong distinction takes inadequate account of the relationship between the observer and the
observation. See, e.g., id. at 1566-67.
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positivism is the sine qua non of social science, international lawyers have
long done battle with a brand of international legal theory that is called
"positivist." Those critical of international legal positivism might see little
reason to expect economic positivist methodologies to illuminate
international legal issues. Again, however, we think that this objection to the
use of L&E methodologies lacks force. In particular, it confuses the
positivism of law and economics with other forms of positivism.
To the extent that international lawyers confront positivism, it is often
in the context of the Westphalian positivist view of the world: a world of
"billiard ball" states that interact only with one another.29 Moreover, this
Westphalian positivist view is often associated with the dominant anarchic,
self-styled "realist" perspective on international relations that holds that
states are not bound by law, since they themselves maintain a monopoly on
coercive force.3" However, this perspective is neither truly realist nor truly
positivist.
This is why many international lawyers and international legal scholars
reject the Westphalian positivist model. They argue that the model either
ignores-or cannot explain-many of the most important phenomena on the
international legal scene, including the rise of non-state actors; the
importance and, at times, relative independence, of international
organizations; and the binding force of international law. Thus, there is little
room in Westphalian positivism for binding treaties to allocate regulatory
authority, or for the pooling of regulatory authority in international
organizations. In this model, international agreements only last as long as
the short-term interests that motivated them; they are epiphenomenal to the
power and interest equation that explains egotistical state action of the
moment."1 There is little room for the incursions on sovereignty experienced
in the European Union (EU), or for the strengthened dispute resolution of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), or for many of the other institutions
that constitute the core of what international lawyers do and study. In this
sense, international lawyers rightly understand positivism to turn a blind eye
to precisely those phenomena that interest them the most.
29. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948)
(providing a description of the Westphalian positivist view of the world and international relations).
The "billiard ball" metaphor comes from ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS
ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 19-24 (1962).
30. For good introductions to this "realist" perspective, see HANS J. MORGANTHAU,
POLrTcs AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3-15 (1978) (identifying and
explaining key realist principles); and Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 488-92 (1988) (same).
31. Cf. James E. Alt & Lisa L. Martin, Contracting and the Possibility of Multilateral
Enforcement, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 265 (1994) (discussing various theoretical
approaches to analyzing the efficacy of international agreements).
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But "positivism" has different meanings in different disciplines, and
the positivism of L&E is very different from the positivism associated with
Westphalian realism. While Westphalian positivism is state-centric, L&E
positivism rests upon methodological individualism." Methodological
individualism assumes that each person is in charge of his or her own utility
function and is a rational evaluative maximizer." It posits no values other
than that of individual choice." Methodological individualism, otherwise
known as consumer sovereignty (perhaps more felicitously termed
"individual sovereignty" in a world in which markets are not the sole forum
for revelation of preferences), is a cosmopolitan concept that stands in
opposition to the state sovereignty erected by Westphalian positivism.
Methodological individualism easily lends itself to contractarian
approaches to issues involving cooperation and/or conflict.3 Analogizing
from the domestic to the international, the positivism associated with
economic analysis easily lends itself to treaty-based or institutional responses
to international issues involving cooperation and/or conflict. For this reason,
the positivism associated with economic analysis tends to highlight-rather
than ignore-the treaties, institutions, and other international legal
phenomena that are most interesting to international legal scholars.3
In short, the most common reasons advanced for not exploring whether
L&E might enrich our understanding of international law are not persuasive.
The L&E methodologies most likely to be useful are not terribly exotic and,
32. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 37-
39 (1989) (discussing rational choice models and methodological individualism).
33. Although economists and other social scientists study the limits and domain of this
assumption, it still provides the basis for most models. This rationalism entails self-interest, although
neither the definition of "self" nor the definition of "interest" is uncontested. Rather, self-interest is
being reexamined to accommodate behavior that seems or is normative, altruistic, or self-abnegating.
See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998) (drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems of individuals and governments to
illustrate that behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard
economic analysis of law).
34. See Joseph Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social Value, 23 Q.J. EcON. 213, 214-17
(1909) ("For only individuals can feel wants.").
35. Methodological individualism actually requires a contractarian approach, as it argues
that the only reason for entering society is to maximize individual preferences. A Pareto-efficiency
test of whether individual preferences are maximized in this type of context asks whether each
individual agrees, at some level, to the arrangements. This search for individual agreement requires
and validates a contractarian approach.
36. Many lawyers may also object to another attribute of law and economics' positivism-its
insistence on the distinction between things as they are and things as they ought to be, between "is"
and "ought"-arguing that law necessarily entails a normative dimension. As this issue has been
thoroughly explored elsewhere, we do not revisit it here. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in
Laiv and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REv. 815, 815 (1990) (arguing that the "unconstrained application of
economic positivism to legal analysis produces an impoverished view of the goals of law."); Avery
Weiner Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 2229 (1996)
(arguing that one of the foremost cultural differences between the disciplines of law and economics is
economists' methodological commitment to positivism); Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding
Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2054 (1995) (outlining an historical account of the evolution of legal
positivism in American jurisprudence).
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in fact, have a structure and focus that should be familiar to international
lawyers. In addition, these methodologies do not have a bias in favor of the
market as opposed to the state, or for economic values as opposed to other
values. To the contrary, these methodologies take as central and contingent
the question whether market or nonmarket mechanisms are appropriate in
any particular instance. Finally, these methodologies do not deny a role for,
or the reality of, international law. Instead, they direct us towards the very
phenomena that are already at the center of the international legal agenda.37
Of course, demonstrating that arguments against the use of L&E
analysis lack force is not, in itself, any reason to believe that L&E analysis
will be useful to international lawyers. It is to this task that we now turn.
m. THE STRUCTURAL ANALOGY: THE SUPRA-MARKET OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GAINS FROM TRADE
Before engaging in the economic analysis of international legal
problems, we will explore whether international legal problems have some
characteristics in common with those already addressed by law and
economics. While it is not necessary for our purposes that the analogy be
perfect, or even good (although we think it is), relevant similarities facilitate
the transfer of tools from the domestic sphere to the international. Hence,
we outline here the argument that transactions in international relations are
analogous to transactions in private markets. This argument has already been
made in applying economic tools to many nonmarket circumstances,
including subjects as diverse as politics and family life. In subsequent
sections, we outline arguments for more specific analogies between
particular international legal problems and particular domestic legal
problems.3"
At its core, the relevant similarity is that international society, like any
society, is a place where individual actors or groups of actors encounter one
another and sometimes have occasion to cooperate, to engage in what may
broadly be termed "transaction[s]. " " This analogy has been developed by,
37. We do not intend these arguments as a defense of economic theory and methodology
generally, including the utility of abstract modeling, the assumption of rationality, and the use of the
efficiency criterion. For more on these issues, see generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
38. In drawing these particular analogies, such as the analogy between the firm and the
international organization, we do not intend to participate in larger international legal debates over the
appropriateness of the "domestic analogy." See, e.g., HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY
AND WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS 9-23 (1989) (outlining the longstanding debate over the "domestic
analogy"); Slaughter Burley, supra note 3, at 209 n.13 (summarizing recent scholarship on the topic).
39. "The most fundamental unit of analysis in economic organization theory is the
transaction-the transfer of goods or services from one individual to another." PAUL MILOROM &
JOHN ROBERTS, EcONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 21 (1992).
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inter alia, Abbott, Keohane, Krasner, and Waltz.4" In this literature, markets
are understood to arise out of the activities of individual persons or firms.
These individuals seek to further their self-defined interests through the most
efficacious means available. While each individual acts for himself, "[firom
the action of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of
them. Once formed, a market becomes a force in itself, and a force that the
constitutive units acting singly or in small numbers cannot control."41
So, too, for the international system.42 Like economic markets, the
international system is formed by the interactions of self-regarding units-
largely, but not exclusively, states. These utilitarian states interact to
"overcome the deficiencies that make them unable to consummate ...
mutually beneficial agreements."" 3 Actors in each system are willing-to
some extent-to relinquish autonomy in order to obtain certain benefits.'
Both the international and the domestic systems, then, are individualist in
origin, spontaneously-generated and unintended products of self-interested
behavior.45
The assets traded in this international "market" are not goods or
services per se, but assets peculiar to states: components of power. In a legal
context, power is jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction
to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce. In international society, the
equivalent of the market is simply the place where states interact to
cooperate on particular issues-to trade in power-in order to maximize
their baskets of preferences. To be sure, states may also trade in money or
physical assets; however, the unique feature of states is their possession of
40. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (emphasizing that international cooperation is based on
shared interests and partially on mutual agreement); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 24-26 (1979) (describing the international system in terms of the relative
power positions of states and the need for an imperialist state or group of states to maintain power
surpluses over others); Abbott, supra note 5, at 375-77 (discussing how state interaction resembles
firms and the market); Stephen Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 (1991) (arguing that institutional arrangements are better
explained by the relative power distribution among various national actors than by concerted efforts to
solve problems of market failure); Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International
Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317 (1976) (correlating the presence of a hegemonic power with openness of
the international trading system). Other international law scholars have noted the transactional nature
of international relations without explicitly drawing the analogy to market transactions. See, e.g., IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 603-34 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing sources of
law on treaties and other international transactions); 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1179
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (describing the nature of international
transactions among nation states and distinguishing between unilateral and multilateral actions).
41. WALTZ, supra note 40, at 24-26.
42. Rejection of this analogy is not fatal to our larger project in this Article. One could, for
example, reject the "larger" analogy between international relations and market transactions, but
nevertheless accept the "smaller" analogies between, for example, contract and treaty, or the
international organization and the firm.
43. KEOHANE, supra note 40, at 83.
44. In fact, the contractarian model is more easily applicable to the international system than
to the domestic, as the international system has more viable exit options.
45. See KEOHANE, supra note 40, at 83-84.
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governmental regulatory authority in the broad sense. International law is
concerned with the definition, exchange, and pooling of this authority.
States enter the market of international relations in order to obtain
gains from exchange. For present purposes, we can understand the structure
of this market as follows: Beginning from the state of nature, the first level
of "trade" is that which establishes constitutional rules-rules about how
subsequent and subordinate rules will be made. The next level of trade is
that which allows departure from the state of nature: establishment of
market-organizing rules of non-coercion, property rights, and contract.
These rules facilitate additional transactions among states. Finally,
institutions can be established to constrain (positively or negatively)
transaction choices in the future.46 Of course, in contexts where there are no
gains from trade, there should be no trade; that is, depending on the context,
no cooperation, no treaty, and/or no integration may result. This idea is
implicit in price theory-based neoclassical economics. We identify below
some of the possible sources of gains from exchange.
A. Externalities and Exchange
Actions or inactions of states may have positive or negative "effects"
on other states. Thus, for example, the environmental law (or deficiencies
therein) in one state may be associated with adverse or beneficial effects
(negative or positive externalities) in other states, because (for example) the
first state's law permits pollution that flows to other states. Domestic
environmental laws may also "cause" adverse effects in other states by being
too strict regarding the entry of foreign goods into the national market, or
too lax with respect to domestic industries, resulting in competitiveness
effects (pecuniary externalities). Externalization through regulation that fails
to protect foreign interests, pecuniary externalization through strict
regulation that has protectionist effects or through lax regulation that may be
viewed as a subsidy, and subsidization itself may all be viewed as questions
of prescriptive jurisdiction: which state-or international body-will have
power to regulate which actions?
These external effects may cause other states to wish to alter some of
these activities, through their own regulation or through changes in the first
state's regulation. There are two main ways to do so: the first is bilateral
persuasion; the second is through institutionalization. Bilateral persuasion
may involve force, exchange, or implicit reciprocities (either specific or
46. As described below, spillovers of public goods may provide incentives for states to
transact. For an analysis of spillovers of public goods, and the consequent market for agreement
constraining or facilitating spillovers, see Albert Breton, Public Goods and the Stability of Federalism,
23 KYKLOS 882 (1970).
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diffuse);47 it occurs in the "spot market." Institutionalization involves the
transfer of power over time through a treaty or an international organization.
However, externalization cannot be the lone touchstone for
determining when local legislation might fall to integrationist goals.48 First,
externalities are notoriously difficult to define.49 More importantly, the
identification of externalities presupposes established property rights; that is,
economists take property rights as givens, and define externalities based on
the effects of one person's actions on the property rights of another,
although the latter may not have any legal recourse.50 But in the regulatory
context identified above, it is precisely the scope of each state's power-its
jurisdiction-that is at issue. This must be defined before we can properly
speak of externalities." Finally, even if we could define externalities
separately from property rights, we might expect that "property rights
develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become
larger than the cost of internalization." 52
Of course, the creation of such rights-and rules regarding the
allocation of jurisdiction to prescribe-raise a host of other issues. Power
and wealth are, of course, central to this process. Different distributions of
power would likely produce different patterns of property rights; these
property rights then become the framework within which wealth is created
and distributed.53 Economic analysis, primarily through the Coase
Theorem,54 exposes the distributive ramifications, and therefore the
inescapably value-laden nature, of the decision to create property rights and
47. See Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1, 27
(1986).
48. But see Jacques Leboeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the
Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 556 (1994) (arguing that externalization is the
appropriate touchstone).
49. Demsetz recognizes that "[e]xternality is an ambiguous concept" that includes external
costs, external benefits, and non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary externalities. See Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. Rlv. PAPERS AND PROC. 347, 348 (1967).
50. To a realist lawyer, this is a strange formulation: if the harm can be done with impunity,
the property rights bundle must not include the relevant stick. This leads us to a recognition that the
entire concept of externality begs the question of legal rights. Therefore, arguments that we should
design legal rights to internalize externalities are circular.
51. See Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of
Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at 642, 655-57 (analogizing rules
of prescriptive jurisdiction in international society to rules of property in domestic society).
52. Demsetz, supra note 49, at 350. It is also plausible to expect that the costs of
establishing and enforcing property rights would decline, and the benefits would increase, as
population density increases. Greater functional economic integration would presumably yield similar
results in the international arena.
53. See KEOHANE, supra note 40, at 18.
54. For a summary of the Coase Theorem and references to further literature, see Robert D.
Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in THE NEw PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 457, 457-60
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). See also Robert D. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1982) (critiquing the Coase Theorem); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, The Coase Theorem:
Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982) (stating Coase's proposition that agents will
reach profit maximizing outcomes through bargaining).
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to "internalize" externalities.5 Moreover, to the extent that these property
rights represent public goods, we might expect them to be under-produced
by the market, acting alone. We return to these issues below.
B. Economies of Scale and Scope
Related potential sources of gains from trade are economies of scale
and economies of scope. 6 Given the increasingly global nature of society,
and of problems such as environmental degradation and trade, it seems
likely that there would be economies of scale, under some circumstances, in
the international or regional regulation of these matters. 7
Economies of scale have a number of components. First, states may
enjoy economies of scale in contexts where they regulate transnational
actors. For example, there may be efficiencies gained through coordinated
rule-making, surveillance, and enforcement activities. In the absence of
these transactions, states face heightened risks of evasion, detrimental
regulatory competition (which can be driven by externalization), and
unjustified regulatory disharmony, all resulting in inefficiencies.58 Second,
there may be technological economies of scale, relating to equipment,
acquisition of specialized skills, or organization. Economies of scale may
provide a motivation for integration in order to capture these economies.
Economies of scope are reductions in cost resulting from centralized
production of a group of products, especially where the products share a
common component. 9 Once several areas of international regulation are
established, economies of scope may be realized by regulating other areas.
The Uruguay Round Agreements provide a good example of the utility, both
ex ante and ex post, of expanding the subject matter of coverage. Ex ante,
the expanded coverage of the Agreements allowed the grand bargain among
those seeking liberalized trade in agriculture and textiles and those seeking
new rules in intellectual property rights and services. Ex post, it added the
55. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-60 (1984).
56. The dividing line between externalities, on the one hand, and uncaptured economies of
scale, on the other hand, is not clear. An uncaptured economy of scale is a circumstance in which, by
sharing resources, two or more persons may achieve efficiencies. The failure of one to agree to share
confers a detriment on the other, and is therefore analogous to an externality.
57. Of course, the fact that it is efficient to regulate activity from a global perspective does
not mean that only one regulator should exist; rather it is a problem of contracting and establishing the
most efficient institutional structure in response to technical or contextual factors. A similar caveat
applies with respect to "economies of scope."
58. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization
and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 66-70 (1993) (outlining the benefits of centralization and
economies of scale).
59. See J. Panzar & R. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. EcON. REv. 268, 269 (1981)
(discussing shareable inputs, economies of sharing, and multi-product firms).
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possibility for cross-retaliation among these areas in WTO dispute
resolution.60
Finally, economies of scale and scope may arise from increased
frequency of transactions or from longer duration of transactions. Given
greater numbers of transactions in international relations, one would expect
greater economies of scale. In addition, learning curve effects may, over
time, give rise to economies of experience, which are economies of scale
and scope that arise from repeated activity over time.6
C. Transactions and Institutions
States may enter into one-off unilateral transfers of power or
jurisdiction, for example, when one state's courts determine that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens or another doctrine of abstention calls on them to
decline adjudicative jurisdiction in favor of another forum. Alternatively,
states may enter into treaties to exchange jurisdiction over time with respect
to a particular subject matter. For instance, states may enter into extradition
treaties whereby they agree on the circumstances under which they will
transfer jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against particular individuals. In
addition, states may enter into institutional arrangements-constituted by
treaties-that provide for legislative capacity to agree on further exchanges
of jurisdiction over time. The Treaty of Rome is a leading example of a
circumstance in which an international organization is accorded power to
legislate over time. Many EU harmonization directives, particularly those
that provide for mutual recognition, take jurisdiction away from one state
and transfer it to another.
The. new institutional economics assumes a dichotomy between
transactions and institutions. But between the spot market transaction and the
formal organization there exist many types of formal contracts and informal
arrangements, and even the formal organization is a nexus of contracts.
Thus, the supposed dichotomy is, in fact, a continuum: the boundary
between the transaction and the institution is blurred.62 The metric of this
continuum is the relative scope of retained individual discretion: where the
individual retains greater discretion, she is closer to the pole of the market;
where the individual retains less discretion-and assigns more discretion
60. Ex post trade-offs can be compared to "relational contracting," where multiple
relationships give rise to greater protection against opportunism. See KEOHANE, supra note 40, at
103-04.
61. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Learning by Doing, 29 REv. ECON. STUD.
166 (1962). All of these economies may be related to the phenomenon of "spillover" often considered
in connection with neo-functional approaches to international integration. See ERNST HAAS, BEYOND
THE NATION STATE 48 (1964).
62. See Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 367, 373 (1983) ("Coase mistakenly made a sharp
distinction between intrafirm and interfirm transactions, claiming that while the latter represented
market contracts the former represented planned direction.").
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through contract or organization-she is closer to the pole of the firm.63 This
continuum is translated in international economic relations to the continuum
running from intergovernmentalism to integration, where integration denotes
a pooling of authority.
Indeed, Coase's dichotomy of firm and market may usefully be
compared to Albert Hirschman's dichotomy of voice and exit.' The main
difference between the market and the firm is in the duration of relations and
in how decisions are made. In the (spot) market, decisions are binary: one
either enters (buy) or exits (sell). The firm entails longer-term relationships,
requiring that one exercise voice. Voice is heterogeneous, including various
mechanisms that may amount to selective or partial exit, such as the ability
to vote out a government.
These analytical perspectives allow us to understand the choices that
states make in deciding how to relate to one another. There may be
circumstances where it is easier (in transaction cost and strategic terms) to
engage in transactions through a market-type mechanism. Alternatively, in
some circumstances it may be easier to engage in transactions-to deal in
power or jurisdiction-through organizational mechanisms. The recognition
that these mechanisms are related and comparable allows states to compare
them and to match their characteristics to particular circumstances more
accurately.
Thus, states choose among varying types and locations of transactions
in power. Law and economics would predict that their choice depends on
factors such as transaction costs and strategic considerations. So, the United
States might seek to convince other states to implement anti-bribery laws
through bilateral negotiations, through the OECD (in fact the forum in
which a treaty was successfully negotiated), or through the WTO (which
stood in the wings as a potential alternate forum). We can see a similar set
of possibilities for negotiation of rules for foreign direct investment. Capital-
importing countries may constrain their sovereignty-may transfer
jurisdiction-to expropriate foreign investment under bilateral investment
treaties. However, the United States and other capital-exporting countries
have recently attempted to achieve a multilateral agreement on investment
under the auspices of the OECD. These negotiations could move to the
63. In this context, discretion means residual discretion to be exercised in the future. This
formulation can be further refined. Through decentralization within the firm, the amount of individual
discretion within the firm may be made to equal the amount of discretion an individual might retain
outside the firm. Thus, the continuum has two parameters: the first parameter is the degree of
integration into the firm (or other integration structure, including contract); the second parameter is
the degree of centralization within the firm.
64. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 19 (1970). Joseph Weiler uses this dichotomy to analyze
European constitutionalization. See Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.
2403, 2411-12 (1991).
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WTO in order to provide (1) greater possibilities for exchange of
concessions; (2) stronger dispute resolution; and (3) the possibility for cross-
retaliation between varying sectors in order to enhance enforceability.
Similarly, European Union member states considering a Europe-wide
initiative enjoy a degree of choice as to whether to locate the initiative in the
European Union, utilizing its executive, legislative, and judicial institutions,
or to construct freestanding treaty regimes.
D. Limits of the Structural Analogy
It is not necessary to fully analogize the world of international relations
to a private market in order to apply the tools of law and economics to the
international realm. Indeed, we appreciate that the structural analogy
described above has significant limitations when applied to international
relations.65 Some of the limitations of the analogy are also limitations of the
scope of applicability of economic analysis. We review below three of the
more interesting and important arguments regarding the limitations of
economic analysis in the international domain. Significantly, these
limitations of economic analysis also exist, in less obvious form, in many of
the domestic areas in which law and economics has become dominant. We
develop this idea-of a bidirectional critique-in Part VII below.
1. The Problem of Non-Monetized Exchange
The international market for power is different from the market for
private goods along many dimensions, some of which are discussed above.
While there may well be exchange in the market of international relations,
this market is not normally a cash market. Rather, it is most often a barter
market, with all the difficulties and transaction costs of barter. For example,
agreements within the European Community to engage in mutual recognition
of regulation are a kind of barter; similarly, all trade negotiations are
essentially complex, usually multiparty, barter. Trade negotiators try to
value the concessions they make and receive, but this is done in an
extremely inexact manner.
The fact that this market for state power is not extensively monetized
does not block its economic analysis. Economists have increasingly turned
their attention to the analysis of social phenomena where value is exchanged
65. A number of the most obvious dissimilarities-for example, between the role that
elimination through competition plays in the economic and international political spheres-are not
discussed in text because they are less relevant to our analysis. Another dissimilarity is that bargains
among firms can be enforced by a third party, while this is not generally the case for bargains among
states. For further discussion of third-party enforcement of bargains among international firms, see
Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 503-04
(1991). But this means that states need to seek other mechanisms for ensuring compliance, as we
discuss below.
1999]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
but not assessed in monetary terms.66 While price theory-based economic
analysis is rendered more difficult in non-monetized contexts, the type of
institutional analysis described in this Article does not rely on monetization
and is very similar in its application to the private firm and to the
international organization.
Finally, even preferences that are monetized, and money itself, may
not be commensurable or fungible.6' Again, this is much less an argument
against the institutional analysis suggested here, than an argument about the
limitations of price theory-based mathematical economics. The theoretical
perspective of this Article would clearly be incomplete if it failed to take all
preferences into account, including both those that are easily monetized and
those subject to greater problems of incommensurability.6"
2. The Problem of State Rationality
Another potential problem with this model is that it assumes that states
are rational utility-maximizers.69 While the assumption of rationality of
individuals is under sustained attack, an assumption of rationality may be
even less acceptable as applied to states, as the literature on social choice
and public choice suggests.7° For example, Andrew Guzman has explored
the question of why nations enter into treaties that appear to be contrary to
their interests, 1 and Paul Stephan has suggested that elite groups and
executive branch officials can use international lawmaking processes to
further their own interests, rather than broader national interests.72 At
present, we are more interested in identifying this problem than in resolving
it. For present purposes, we believe that
66. For example, the public choice analysis of politics systematically applies economic
analysis to exchanges of value in the political system and outside the normal monetized market for
private goods.
67. See ViviANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 26-29 (1994) (arguing that
money is not fungible); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHm. L. RaV. 1175,
1192 (1997) (same).
68. We return to the problem of incommensurability in Part VII, infra.
69. While rationalist international relations theory does not attempt to explain these
preferences, liberal institutionalism recognizes the need to get inside the "billiard ball" and understand
how state preferences are formed and expressed. For more on the differences between these
approaches, see, for example, Robert Powell, Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The
Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate, 48 INT'L ORG. 313 (1994) (reviewing NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS
(Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) and NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
(David A. Baldwin ed., 1993)).
70. Arrow and Buchanan suggest that organizations have no rationality of their own, but
rather that they intermediate, imperfectly, for individuals. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 21 (1951); BUCHANAN, supra note 32, at 39.
71. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
72. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997).
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[w~hether it makes pragmatic theoretical sense to impute interests, expectations, and the
other paraphernalia of coherent intelligence to an institution is neither more nor less
problematic, a priori, than whether it makes sense to impute them to an individual. The
pragmatic answer appears to be that the coherence of institutions varies but is
sometimes substantial enough to justify viewing a collectivity as acting coherently.'
Finally, it should be recognized that private market analyses depend
substantially on assumptions of corporate rationality.
3. The Problem of Endogenous Preferences
A final problem to be acknowledged here is that the structural analogy
takes state preferences as exogenous. That is, state preferences are simply
"given," and then strategies are developed to maximize these preferences.
Preferences, however, depend on context-particularly the existing political,
legal, and institutional arrangements. This suggests a logical difficulty with
attempts to explain legal rules or institutions as simple aggregations of
preferences; when preferences are a function of legal rules, these rules
cannot, without circularity, be justified by reference to the preferences. It
also suggests a dynamic element that is missing from the structural analogy.
Since international institutions modify state preferences, the very preferences
that might otherwise lead to institutionalization may be changed by the
presence of that institution.
Recent work in international law and international relations scholarship
has emphasized the ways in which state interests and even identities are not
exogenously given but rather constituted through interaction on the basis of
shared legal norms. Constructivist political scientists have argued "that the
fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly
material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures shape
actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim that
opposes rationalism)." 74 Similar arguments have been made by international
lawyers such as Harold Koh, who argues that states internalize international
legal norms through a complex pattern of interactions involving both
international and domestic processes of norm enunciation and
interpretation.75 Hence, leading international relations and international law
73. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in
Political Life, 78 AM. POL. Scm. REv. 734, 739 (1984) (footnote omitted).
74. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT'L SECURITY. 71, 71-72
(Summer 1995). For more on this "constructivist" school of thought, see JOHN G. RuGGIE,
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998);
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is fWhat States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46
INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
75. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996) (arguing
that international legal norms are formulated via a transnational legal process involving domestic and
international actors) [hereinafter Koh, Legal Process]; Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (explaining how nations internalize international
norms) [hereinafter Koh, Nations Obey]. The Chayeses employ similar arguments. See ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
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scholarship seriously challenges the L&E assumption that state interests are
exogenous.
We do not seek to minimize these theoretical difficulties. However,
while these problems are worthy of sustained analysis and receive further
attention below, they do not fatally undermine the effort to apply economic
analysis to international legal phenomena. Thus, we turn to an economic
analysis of three particular international legal issues: jurisdiction to
prescribe. the rules of treaty, and international organizations.
IV. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
The discussion above implicitly analogizes domestic property to
international prescriptive jurisdiction. In this Part, we pursue this analogy;
in particular, we explore whether law and economics methodologies that
have proven useful in the analysis of property law can be usefully applied to
questions of international jurisdiction.
Economists often refer to property rights as the "ability to enjoy a
piece of property,"7" or "the individual's ability to directly consume the
services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange,"" in
contrast to the "bundle of rights" approach more often used by lawyers.
From an economic perspective, the legal recognition of property interests is
viewed as a means for the protection of the economic value of property.
More importantly, the economic conception of property is broader than the
legal conception, encompassing those interests in property that arise by
nonlegal custom or comity.7"
While neoclassical economics has often limited itself to the study of
market transactions, the initial establishment of property rights is a meta-
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). For an earlier treatment of similar themes, see FRIEDRICH V.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1989) (examining the role
of norms in international affairs).
76. BARZEL, supra note 18, at 3.
77. See id. at 90. For more on the "bundle of rights" approach to property, see, for
example, Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NoMos 69 (1980), who argues that the
internal logic of market economies tends to fragment the concept of property, but that this
fragmentation tends to undermine the moral basis for capitalism, and J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996), who argues that the "bundle of rights"
model is not a true theoretical model. For the classic articulation of this conception of property, see
A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961), where
he attempts to identify the standard bundle of rights that constitutes ownership of property.
78. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw 169-74 (1991). A broader point is
that either of these concepts can be made to include not only traditional property rights, but also tort,
contract, and regulatory assignments of rights. In fact, the better way to describe the domestic analog
of prescriptive jurisdiction is in terms of "entitlements," in the sense used by Calabresi and Melamed.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1972).
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market phenomenon and is, in a general sense, pre-transactional. 9 In this
sense, property rights form a substructure on which further transactions may
be built; transactions then are exchanges of property rights. Recall our
analogy to prescriptive jurisdiction: in the world of prescriptive jurisdiction,
custom, treaty, or other international legislation would form the substructure
on which further transactions in prescriptive jurisdiction could be built.
These further transactions might themselves also be effected through treaties
or other devices.
A. Transaction Cost Economics
Prior to Coase, economics presumed property rights but did not
analyze them. Coase revolutionized our thinking about assignments of
property rights.O While Coase showed that under zero transaction costs, the
allocation of property rights does not affect efficiency, under positive
transaction costs-the world as it is-it is appropriate to consider the design
of property rights and rules of prescriptive jurisdiction. Often, law and
economics scholars call simply for clear property rights. Often, international
legal scholars call for clarification of international legal rules regulating
prescriptive jurisdiction. But these calls are often based either on a
misreading of the Coase Theorem, or on an assumption that clarity
invariably minimizes transaction costs.
It is not necessarily true that clarity always solves the problem of
property rights. For example, even "clear" property rules may
inappropriately distribute the "bundle of rights," leading to an inefficient
underuse of resources;8" in other contexts, "muddy" rules may be
appropriate even in the absence of high transaction costs.82 Similarly, it is
not clear that clarity solves the problem of jurisdiction. Clarity is thought to
reduce transaction costs. However, the simple minimization of transaction
costs is an inappropriate goal; this perspective is incomplete without
examining transaction gains.8" Moreover, the transaction gain component is
also incomplete without considering those gains in net terms: subtracting
79. See Demsetz, supra note 49, at 350-53. On the other hand, beginning from a state of
nature, or in circumstances where property rights have not been developed, property rights may
themselves be formulated as part of an exchange: "You recognize my exclusive rights to harvest the
field that I cultivate, and I will not take game from the traps that you set." This type of exchange may
be generalized to form part of a "social contract," and may result in property law. See BARZEL, supra
note 18, at 85-104 (stating that people can have economic rights over their property even in a society
that does not have legal rights).
80. For more on the Coase Theorem, see supra note 54.
81. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticomnons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Market, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998) (stating that clear rules that disaggregate the
traditional bundle of ownership rights render effective use of property nearly impossible in some
economies in transition).
82. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 594
(1988).
83. See KOMESAR, supra note 21, at 106.
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transaction losses (including opportunity costs) from transaction gains."
Thus, when there are opportunity costs, including "interdependence costs,""5
associated with agreed allocation of authority or international organization,
these must enter the calculation.
While clarity is not necessarily the solution, we can formulate a rough
guide to identifying solutions in particular circumstances. The most efficient
rule of prescriptive jurisdiction will maximize the sum of (1) efficiency gains
from allocation or reallocation to the state that values the right to exercise
jurisdiction the most; and (2) transaction costs of such allocation and of
reallocation following from an initial allocation to a state other than that
which values the jurisdiction the most. 6 Of course, this equation raises
tremendous problems of evaluation, commensurability, and interpersonal
comparison of utility. 7
Clarity may be the solution in circumstances where it is difficult to
make the initial allocation accurately by virtue of property rules, and where
transaction costs are low, allowing reallocation to the most efficient uses
through transactions. Thus, if it were easy for the United States to sell,
barter, or otherwise transfer for value to the European Union exclusive
jurisdiction over the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, or for the
European Union to sell those rights to the United States, then perhaps a clear
rule of exclusive jurisdiction would be the efficient solution (leaving aside
for the moment the distributive question of where jurisdiction is initially
assigned). On the other hand, if transaction costs are high, perhaps it is
better to maintain concurrent jurisdiction or muddy jurisdiction. This
amounts to a kind of institutionalization because the contending states must
somehow share control of these assets (more or less cooperatively). The
84. See Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. COMMON MARKET STUDS. 473, 492-93 (1993) ("The more
divergent national policies are to begin with, the greater the costs of co-operation. Nonetheless, where
these costs are outweighed by the interest in reducing negative policy externalities, international policy
co-ordination can help governments reach an optimal balance between increased market access and the
maintenance of regulatory standards.").
85. Buchanan and Tullock refer to the sum of costs incurred through the actions of others in
the organization as "decision-making costs." See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, TuE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 44 (1962). John Ruggie uses this term "to mean a more general loss of
control over one's own activities, resulting from the accumulation of collective constraints." John G.
Ruggie, Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration, 66 AM. POL. SC. Rv. 874, 878
n.24 (1972). From an economic perspective, this relates to opportunity costs, or the costs of
foreclosed options (assuming some valuation of options).
86. We can formalize this by stating that states should seek to apply the rule of prescriptive
jurisdiction that maximizes the present value of net gains: NG = TG - (TL + TCQ, where
NG = net gains;
TG = gains from allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction to the state to which it is most valuable;
TL = loss from allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction away from other states; and
TC = transaction costs.
87. We address these issues in more detail in Sections VII.B and VII.C, infra.
[Vol. 24:1
Economic Analysis of International Law
institutionalization between the European Union and the United States, by
virtue of the agreement on cooperation in competition law between the two
jurisdictions, transatlantic intergovernmental ties, and the general
international law system, is insufficient to bind the parties to an immediate
and complete solution. However, after some period of contention, the
institutionalization will no doubt be sufficient to allow a resolution.
As we will discuss below, one of several potential solutions to the
problem of allocation of jurisdiction is more complete institutionalization or
more extensive transfer of competences to an integrative institution, such as
an ad hoe bilateral dispute resolution tribunal, or a multilateral body, such as
the WTO. The availability of relatively strong dispute resolution under the
WTO has served as a magnet to draw in many types of claims that otherwise
would have lacked strong institutional contexts. It is in this connection that
both the legal rules themselves and the institutional framework for applying
the legal rules must be evaluated in order to assess the binding nature of
legal structures.
A shift in the analysis began with Calabresi and Melamed's analysis of
entitlements in terms both of the party who is assigned the entitlement, and
of the remedies available, beginning with the different remedies available for
violation of a property right (injunction) and violation of a duty in tort
(damages).8" They suggested that property rules may be used to promote
efficient exchange where transaction costs are low, while liability rules may
be appropriate where transaction costs are high. 9 In the latter case, courts
set the price of transfer, and the "owner" may be forced to accept the price
so set. Thus, the choice between property and liability is a partial choice
between the market and the state as the institution for effecting transfers of
the relevant asset.
We might ask, why, in international society where transaction costs
seem high, do we not see more liability rules, as opposed to the dominance
of property-type rules? This suggests an even more puzzling question: What
would a rule of liability, as opposed to property, look like in international
law? First, the move to liability provides the person invading the property
with a license to do so. In more advanced economic terms, it assigns an
option to the invader to invade, at a specified exercise price. Second, the
move to liability implicates more judgment on the part of a court or
centralized institution that must determine what the invaded right was worth
88. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 78. As Calabresi and Melamed correctly note,
most domestic entitlements are partially protected by property rules and partially protected by liability
rules. See id. at 1093. Calabresi and Melamed also note that entitlements are, at times, protected by
inalienability rules. See id. at 1111-15. For present purposes, it is sufficient to discuss the two
primary ways of protecting entitlements: property and liability rules.
89. These claims have been subject to sustained scrutiny. See, e.g., James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 440, 452-65 (1995) (noting that liability rules may be inefficient, even in high transaction cost
settings, if the costs of assessing damages are higher still).
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to the complainant.90 However, as we have seen, the international legal
system lacks extensive institutionalization or tribunals for assessing
damages, and where such bodies exist they often lack compulsory
jurisdiction. Moreover, even the major recent exception to this
generalization-the WTO dispute resolution system-leaves it to the parties,
at least in the first instance, to determine "damages. "91 Why, then, does the
international system utilize property and not liability rules? At least two
"law and economics" answers suggest themselves. Perhaps institutions that
could apply liability rules do not exist because either (1) the cost of creating
a clear property rights system that would allocate jurisdictional power; or (2)
the cost of setting up a complex dispute resolution system to handle the
inevitable disputes that would arise; or (3) the costs of determining and
assessing damages in the specific cases that would arise; or (4) the aggregate
of these costs exceed the benefits to be gained by such a system. In such
circumstances, it would be appropriate that the international system lacked
liability rules.' Even if such a system existed, if there were high costs
associated with determining ex ante exactly who possessed the rights (i.e.,
with determining the content of the law) and high costs associated with
enforcing formal legal rights, states might be reluctant to employ the
system.93
Furthermore, an international law "liability" system may possess many
of the characteristics of a "public good." Even if the community of states
would be better off with a "liability" system and the institutional apparatus
to enforce it, individual states might rationally believe that they could enjoy
the benefits of this system without contributing to the costs of setting it up.
If every state thought this way, then none would contribute to the creation of
90. Neoclassical economics eschews interpersonal comparison of utility by institutions other
than markets, but legislatures and courts are exactly nonmarket mechanisms for interpersonal
comparison of utility.
91. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 22, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the world Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 404
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
92. This "excessive cost" explanation finds some support in the history of international
efforts to create "liability" rules in other contexts. For example, while formal efforts to draft a treaty
setting out the law of state responsibility began during the first session of the International Law
Commission in 1949, no treaty has yet been produced. See John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a
Treaty and Rationalist International Relatons Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 49 & n.88 (1997); Marina
Spinedi & Bruno Simma, Introduction, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
vii (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
93. The domestic analog here would be Robert Ellickson's classic investigation of the
behavior of cattle ranchers in Northern California, finding that social norms and self help were more
efficient regulatory mechanisms than enforcement of formal legal rules. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623
(1986).
[Vol. 24:1
Economic Analysis of International Law
the liability system, and the system would never come into existence. More
generally, the institutional response to underlying substantive policy
problems may implicate many of the collective action problems that plague
efforts to resolve the substantive problems themselves.9'
Our interest here is less in resolving questions regarding the rules
governing the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction than in suggesting that
economic analyses can shed substantial light on these questions. We have
tried to show how transaction cost economics can inform discussions about
the appropriate allocation of jurisdiction to prescribe and the various ways to
resolve conflicts over prescriptive jurisdiction. Other methodologies,
including game theory, can shed light on these issues as well.
B. Game Theory and Economics of Information
The design of property rights, and of rules of jurisdiction, implicate
more than the maximization formula described above-as intimated above,
there is also much room for strategic behavior. The jurisdictional rules
should take the possibility of strategic behavior into account and seek to
minimize the costs attendant thereto.
Ian Ayres, Eric Talley, Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, and others have
evaluated the effects of strategic behavior on the design of efficient
entitlements.95 They have extended the Calabresi/Melamed approach by
suggesting the possible efficiency of "second order" rights. For example,
Ayres and Talley examine the possibility that strategic behavior by a buyer
and seller of property rights would inhibit transactions more than strategic
behavior by two co-owners of an asset.96 They argue that "divided
entitlements"-co-ownership-facilitate trade by providing incentives for the
two parties to reveal information regarding their valuation of the asset.97
This proposition is based on the Coasean insight that transactions are
possible without property: that liability rules or co-ownership rules might
give rise to one party seeking to "purchase" the rights of the other party.
The traditional assumption in law and economics is that transaction costs are
reduced by clear property rights. By focusing on the transaction costs
occasioned by strategic behavior, and more specifically on the costs of
94. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 379-81 (arguing that legal regimes are themselves
collective goods that present collective action problems).
95. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE
L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, A Reply]; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. Rv. 713 (1996)
(arguing that liability rules are superior to property rules because the former are superior in limiting
externality problems).
96. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 95, at 1051-53.
97. See id.
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information, Ayres and Talley argue that there are circumstances-those
where private information is the predominant source of transaction costs-in
which transaction costs are reduced by divided entitlements-that is, by the
most unclear types of allocation. While Ayres and Talley's specific
conclusions have been contested by Kaplow and Shavell,98 the larger point
here is that a game theoretic analysis may add a substantial dimension to the
transaction costs analysis described above.
Indeed, this type of analysis could have important ramifications in a
number of areas. For example, it could inform the decision in international
environmental negotiations to utilize an international emissions trading
scheme (property rules) as opposed to a regime of state liability for trans-
boundary pollution (liability rules). Or it might be used to compare
international negotiations over global commons issues-such as the high seas
or upper atmosphere-with those where "property" rights would seem to be
more clearly defined, such as negotiations among co-riparians over
international watercourses.
V. TREATY AND CONTRACT
Treaties have long been analogized to contracts. Law and economics
scholarship has been enormously influential in the contract area; it is now
commonplace to understand contracts-and contract doctrine-in economic
terms. While the most influential work has been done using the tools of
price theory, there are also substantial literatures using the tools of game
theory and transaction cost economics. In this Part, we explore whether this
scholarship can be usefully applied to the treaty context.
A. Problematizing Treaties
Treaties are the principal source of international rights and obligations.
Nevertheless, despite substantial treaty practice, and a well-developed law of
treaties, a number of doctrinal dilemmas, such as how to harmonize
conflicting treaty obligations and how to resolve the tension between the
principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus, remain
problematic. This doctrinal confusion is symptomatic of deeper conceptual
uncertainties: Why are treaties binding? Do states, in fact, comply with their
treaty obligations and, if so, why? Questions like these will assume
heightened importance as treaties are increasingly used to address complex
economic, political, and social problems that cannot be solved unilaterally.
Past efforts to identify an underlying structure for the law of treaties
have proven unsatisfactory. While the traditional, consent-oriented view of
98. See Kaplow & Shavell, A Reply, supra note 95.
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the law of treaties has been subject to sustained attack,99 no alternative
explanation has gained widespread acceptance. Recent alternatives to
consent-based theories of international law-such as Thomas Franck's
legitimacy-oriented approach,' 0 or Harold Koh's transnational legal process
approach' 0 -pay little attention to the law of treaties, and a leading book on
contemporary treaty practice largely ignores doctrinal issues." 2 We read this
silence as an implicit commentary on the relevance of recent scholarship on
treaty law and doctrine.
Might the methodologies of law and economics reinvigorate this field?
Recent attempts to use rational choice and international relations models to
address particular issues in treaty law represent promising efforts in this
direction. But rather than focus on discrete problems in treaty law, as others
have done, we wish to pose the more generalized question of whether law
and economics approaches that have proven useful in the area of contracts
are likely to be similarly useful in the treaty context.' 3
B. Domestic Analogies and Dissimilarities
International tribunals, and commentators, have long noted the
domestic law analogies to treaty law."° Rather than reproduce these
discussions, we simply summarize below a number of the relevant analogies
and dissimilarities between treaty and contract. This discussion provides a
background for our consideration of whether the law and economics methods
of analyzing contracts can be usefully applied to treaties.
99. See, e.g., JOHN L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 51-54 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (describing how the
consent-oriented doctrine of positivism leads to a distortion of the facts of international law and fails
to explain how obligation is created).
100. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (arguing
that the legitimacy of international rules and processes are a function of various factors, including
determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence).
101. Koh has outlined this approach in a series of recent writings, focusing on interactions
among states and other transnational actors and discussing the internalization of international legal
norms into the internal value sets of domestic legal systems. See, e.g., Koh, Legal Process, supra
note 75; Koh, Nations Obey, supra note 75.
102. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 75.
103. Treaties have also been analogized to legislation, and we believe that public choice
analysis-which has been very influential in the analysis of legislation-could also be usefully applied
to treaties. For an unconventional application of public choice analysis to apparently "deregulatory"
trade liberalization agreements, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and:" Recent Developments in Trade
Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759,
771-74 (1997).
104. For example, a recent WTO Appellate Body Report states that: "The WTO Agreement
is a treaty-the international equivalent of a contract." World Trade Organization, Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/B/R, WTIDSI1OIABIR,
VT/DS11IAB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), available in 1996 WL 738800. The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise
long noted this analogy. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253
(1984) ("A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893) (same); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The
Chinese Exclusion Case) (same).
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As an agreement intended to be legally binding, a treaty is often
considered to be "a form of contract."''s Like contracts, treaties are intended
to serve as a source of rights and obligations between parties. Both are
anchored in the mutual exchange of promises about future behavior, and, as
a general matter, both create law for the contracting parties only." 6
Moreover, treaties are analogized to contracts because both "derive their
validity from the agreement of the parties."'0 7 The law of treaties and the
law of contracts exhibit similar structures, as both "establish rules about the
making and interpretation of agreements, their observation, modification and
termination."' Thus, the bodies of law of both treaty and contract address a
number of similar questions, including questions about capacity, formation,
validity, breach, remedy, and termination.
However, the analogy with contract is far from complete."0 9 Some
dissimilarities result from structural differences between the domestic and
international legal orders. Other differences are doctrinal. As explained
below, we believe that exploration of these differences could give rise to a
fruitful research agenda. For example, a number of contract doctrines find
no analog in the treaty context. A classic example is the doctrine of
consideration. Long required by contract law, the doctrine helps distinguish
agreements that are legally binding from those that are not, and is used to
help prevent opportunistic behavior."0 Although the law of treaties also
distinguishes between binding and nonbinding agreements, and disfavors
opportunistic behavior, there is no corresponding requirement for
consideration. Conversely, a number of treaty doctrines find no counterpart
in the law of contracts."' Finally, even where contract and treaty law
address similar issues, doctrine tends to diverge. For example, contract
doctrine on defenses to performance due to impossibility, frustration, and
the like differ from ostensibly similar defenses to treaty performance.tI2
105. H.W. Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 1926 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 141,
142; see also MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2nd ed. 1993) ("However
styled, [treaties] are in the first place essentially contracts between states.").
106. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 36, T.I.A.S. No. 7,502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the
District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 141 (June 7).
107. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 124 (1948).
108. MARK JANIS & JOHN NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1997).
109. See EVANGELOS RAFTOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN
THE LAW OF TREATIES (1990); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-
1986, at 128 (1989) (describing how the analogy between treaty and contract is "simply false").
110. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97 (4th ed. 1992).
111. The well-developed treaty doctrine regarding the use and status of reservations, for
example, has no counterpart in contract law.
112. Also, the analogy with contract is closer for some treaties than for others. while some
treaties are quite similar to contracts-consider, for example, airline landing rights agreements,
bilateral investment treaties, and cultural exchange agreements-other treaties can be more closely
analogized to legislation. Treaties, such as the United Nations Charter, or clusters of treaties, such as
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C. Price Theory and the Efficient Breach Hypothesis
Law and economics begins to approach contract with price theory.
This alone is a powerful tool by which to address the enduring problem of
compliance in international law. From this perspective, the key to
compliance is the price of breach: where the price of a breach is sufficiently
high, compliance will result. The price of breach must be measured both in
terms of the measure of damages and of the extent to which institutions exist
mandatorily to require the payment of damages. With this simple theoretical
proposition, a research program could descriptively evaluate the relative
binding nature of international treaties and could normatively suggest
changes to treaty structures to enhance their binding nature, where enhanced
compliance is in fact desired.
Among the most influential-and controversial-claims made by law
and economics scholars is the theory of efficient breach: There are
circumstances where breach of contract is more efficient than performance,
and the law ought to facilitate breach in such circumstances." 4 While this
theory has been enormously influential at the domestic level, its potential
transferability to the international context is problematic; the different
structural and institutional elements of the domestic and international legal
orders suggest caution here.
The efficient breach theory presupposes effective adjudicatory and
enforcement mechanisms that, in the absence of a liquidated damages clause,
can determine and compel payment of the appropriate level of damages in
the event of a breach. That is, where there are no institutions that can
provide for payment of damages, an "efficient breach" rule cannot be
operationalized. But such mechanisms are largely absent from the
international context. The theory also presupposes the willingness to equate
the damages suffered from the breach with a monetary payment, a
presupposition that requires interpersonal (or, in this case, interstate)
comparison of utility and is problematic not only in contract, but also in the
context of, among others, arms control, human rights, national security, and
environmental treaties.
those regulating world trade, can be usefully analogized to corporate charters or to constitutions,
which create and define the powers of new organizations.
113. For a provocative essay questioning whether compliance is the appropriate touchstone,
see George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,
50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996). For sophisticated surveys of the topic of compliance with international
legal obligations, see, for example, Benedict W. Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a
Function of Competing Conceptions of international Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345 (1998), which
argues that the concept of compliance presupposes a theory of international law and outlines four such
theories. See also Koh, Nations Obey, supra note 75 (surveying various traditions and customs that
bind nations); Symposium, Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, 19 MICH J. INT'L L. 303
(1998).
114. See POSNER, supra note 110, at 95-96, 135-36; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of
Damages in Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. Rv. 273 (1970).
1999]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
These structural differences may help explain why questions of
remedies-central to law and economics contract scholarship-occupy a
relatively small role in treaty doctrine and scholarship." 5 They are also
relevant to the discussion, above, about the relationship between property
and liability rules protecting entitlements. The efficient breach hypothesis
would turn a contract damages rule into, in the language of Calabresi and
Melamed, a liability rule; but liability rules have certain drawbacks that are
especially pertinent in the international realm. First, liability rules impose on
the wider community the collective expense of determining an "objective"
cost of a breach. While domestic societies typically provide the "public
good" of well-functioning, compulsory dispute resolution systems, the
international community, as noted above, has often declined to do so."6
Second, liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the
breach to the promisee. Even assuming that such monetization is objectively
possible for the types of "goods" exchanged by treaty-and it often is not-
states may be more reluctant than individuals to subordinate their subjective
valuations to the judgments of others. 7
Some international lawyers will reject the concept of efficient breach
on a normative basis. They might argue that accepting the efficient breach
hypothesis would threaten precisely the feature that renders treaties the
"major instrument of international cooperation in international
relations"'n -the belief that treaties will be obeyed, even when contrary to a
state's immediate, short-term interest. Encouraging, through law, "efficient"
breaches of these treaties would undermine the fundamental rule of pacta
sunt servanda, and likely render more difficult the possibility of sustained
cooperation in an international community through treaty regimes.
Of course, the same objection may be raised in the domestic context.
Contract is important because of the belief that contracts will be obeyed, but
it is still efficient to allow breach under certain circumstances. In fact, entry
into contract may be facilitated by the understanding of the parties that
breach may be permitted under certain circumstances. Alan Sykes has made
a similar argument regarding the GATT escape clause. 9 This raises the
115. But see Setear, supra note 92, at 15-100 (presenting a sophisticated discussion of
international legal doctrine and international relations theory on "rules of release" and "rules of
remediation" that apply in the event of treaty breach).
116. See supra text accompanying note 94.
117. Perhaps this explains some of the concerns over the "democracy deficit" in the WTO,
EU, and other international bodies. These bodies are increasingly making the sorts of trade-offs that
are frequently made by national governments, but many question whether these bodies can
appropriately make such decisions without greater democratic representation.
118. MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (6th ed.
1987).
119. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GAYT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Cm. L. Rav. 255, 274-80 (1991).
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question of whether a liability rule, and the implicit permission for efficient
breach, gives rise to incentives for inefficient strategic conduct. 120
This analysis suggests that where effective dispute resolution exists and
damages can be relatively easily monetized states are more likely to adopt an
"efficient breach" rule. One context in which mandatory dispute resolution
now exists, and in which something akin to efficient breach is permitted, is
the GATT/WTO system.' Under the current WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), when a WTO dispute settlement panel or the
Standing Appellate Body concludes that a measure is GATT-inconsistent, "it
shall recommend" that the measure be brought into conformity with the
GATT.12 1 Once this determination is adopted by the dispute settlement body
(DSB), the state can, and should, comply with the ruling by amending or
withdrawing the offending measure. Alternatively, the state may retain the
offending measure and, instead, provide compensatory benefits to restore the
balance of negotiated concessions disturbed by the noncomplying measure.
Finally, the state may choose not to change its law or to provide
compensation, and, instead, suffer likely retaliation against its exports
authorized by the WTO for the purpose of restoring the balance of
negotiated concessions. Thus, we might usefully understand the WTO
system as authorizing a member to choose to "breach" an obligation, and
pay compensation to the injured party.'23
D. Game Theory, Default Rules, and Strategic Interaction
While game theoretic concepts have been widely used in the analysis of
contract law, their application to treaties has been rather limited." To
120. We identify game theoretic strategies for dealing with inefficient strategic behavior in
the treaty context in Section V.D, infra.
121. In fact, as noted above, efficient breach exists in GATT in two respects. First, the
escape clause provides for a type of efficient breach, available in limited circumstances. See Sykes,
supra note 119, at 278-80; see also Frieder Roessler et al., The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (Feb. 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) (arguing that liability rules in the GATT system facilitate efficient breach). Second, as
described in the text, the dispute resolution features of GATT allow compensation for breach.
122. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 19, para. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL
TEXTS 404 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
123. However, it is clear that this efficient breach, although permitted, is disfavored: "neither
compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered
agreements." Id. art. 22, para. 1. The argument that the DSU creates a strong preference for changing
the offending measure over compensation is developed in John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
60 (1997).
124. Perhaps the most prominent application of game theoretic analysis to treaties has been
John Setear's application of "Institutionalist" theory-particularly aspects concerned with the notion of
iteration-to the law of treaties. See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis
of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996). More
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explore whether fruitful analysis is likely, we briefly survey the area where
game theoretic accounts of contract doctrine have been, perhaps, the most
influential-the analysis of default rules-and then return to treaty. ,21
The game theoretic analysis of default rules begins with the premise
that all contracts are necessarily incomplete. When disputes arise, courts use
"default" rules to fill these contractual gaps. These default rules thus govern
various aspects of the parties' relationship, unless the parties contract around
them. But what default rule should a court apply?
Law and economics scholars attempt to answer this question, in part,
by identifying the causes of contract incompleteness. One cause is
inadequate knowledge: parties cannot possibly foresee every future
contingency that might arise, and the contract will be silent as to these
matters. Incompleteness can also result from strategic calculation. For
example, when the cost of negotiating contract terms is high, parties may
choose not to negotiate terms, ex ante, to cover low probability or low
magnitude contingencies.' 2' Law and economics scholars have argued that
when transaction costs make an explicit agreement too costly, the court
should apply a "default" rule that the parties would have reached had the
costs of negotiating not made their doing so inefficient.2 7
Alternatively, for opportunistic reasons one party may not reveal
information it alone possesses, precluding negotiation over particular issues.
For example, one party might withhold information that would increase the
aggregate gains from contracting in order to increase its own share of those
benefits. In situations where the cost of filling a gap ex post is greater than
the cost of negotiating an explicit bargain ex ante, some law and economics
scholars suggest "penalty" defaults that are "purposefully set at what the
recently, Setear has applied rationalist tools to the issue of remedies resulting from treaty breach. See
Setear, supra note 92.
125. Leading contributions to the literature on default rules include Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); and Jason
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE
L.J. 615 (1990). For a game theoretic account of contract formation rules, see Avery Katz, The
Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89
MICH. L. REv. 215 (1990).
126. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, I1 BELL J. EcON.
466, 468 (1980) ("[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over contractual
obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally impractical to make contracts
which approach completeness."). Thus, transaction cost analysis can be usefully applied to default
rules. See supra text accompanying notes 76-94.
127. For a discussion and analysis of this, see Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory
Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Risks in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL.
639, 707-09 (1989). The argument appears to assume, perhaps inappropriately in some cases, that the
transaction costs and inaccuracy costs of a court decision are less than the costs of explicit agreement.
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parties would not want" in order to "give at least one party to the contract
an incentive to bargain around the default rule."'
Given that parties can always bargain their way around default rules,
why study them in the first place? Law and economics scholars point out that
if the gains from bargaining around the default rule are less than the costs of
bargaining, then the default rule will govern the transaction. In these cases,
the "initial entitlement"-provided by the default rules-will end up being
the "final entitlement." Moreover, even in those cases where the gains from
bargaining exceed the costs of negotiation, the default entitlement still
matters because it determines who will bargain and at what cost. Given
various structural factors that increase the transaction costs of negotiating
treaties-including (often) multiple contracting parties and the need for
subsequent domestic ratification-we night expect high transaction costs to
play at least as large a role on the international plane as on the domestic.
Thus, default rules-in treaty as in contract-are not simply neutral
background rules designed to facilitate agreements; rather, they have
important distributional implications. Moreover, these distributional
implications are strongest when, as in the treaty context, transaction costs
are high. 129
Many Vienna Convention provisions are default rules. Ironically, while
legal scholars have devoted substantial attention to the distributional
consequences of particular treaties, as far as we are aware to date no one
has studied the distributional implications of the Vienna Convention's
provisions-even though these provisions are generally applicable to all
treaties. If the Vienna Convention is the "contract law" of international law,
why is there not a body of literature analyzing its distributional effects?
Game theory could inform a rich research agenda in the treaty area. At
a general level, game theory literature implicitly invites international legal
scholars to focus on the strategic incentives present in treaty negotiation-a
topic largely ignored in writings about the law of treaties-and provides a set
of methodological tools for doing so. For those inclined to more discrete
inquiries, the game theoretic contracts literature suggests a number of
narrower questions about the structure and content of particular provisions
of the Vienna Convention. For instance, why is it that some Vienna
Convention default rules-such as those on dispute resolution-are quite
frequently contracted around, while others-for example, the provisions
regarding treaty breach-are rarely contracted around? 3' Do either of these
rules minimize transaction or strategic behavior costs? Are these, or other
Vienna Convention rules, designed to maximize the benefits states gain from
entering into treaties?
128. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 125, at 91.
129. See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13
(1972).
130. See Setear, supra note 92, at 23; see also Setear, supra note 124.
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Finally, by suggesting that the default rules will determine what types
of information will be exchanged during bargaining, this scholarship invites
us to focus on the process of information exchange during negotiations. Law
and economics scholars argue that when communication is costly and
information incomplete-as is often true in the treaty context-parties will
fail to realize the full potential gains from exchange. The amount of this loss
depends, in part, on the institutions and rules governing bargaining, and this
suggests that the Convention's rules have important consequences for the
efficiency of exchange."13
Thus, game theoretic analysis can be helpful in illuminating the
efficiency and distributional consequences of particular Vienna Convention
rules, the law of treaties generally, and various particular treaties. We also
believe that other fruitful inquiries might be possible using further
refinements introduced by a transaction cost approach, as used in the section
on jurisdiction, above, and the section on international organizations, below.
VI. FIRMS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As discussed above, conflicting jurisdictional claims can be resolved
through transactions in jurisdiction (through treaty or otherwise); they may
also be addressed by pooling jurisdiction in international organizations.
Shared ownership may be the best approach to dealing with the allocation of
some types of rights. Often, shared ownership will be associated with
particular types of "public goods,""2 or with "constitutional" rules
governing how future decisions will be made regarding the disposition of
such assets. To the extent that jurisdiction is shared or pooled, integration
occurs.
All students of international law are familiar with the debate regarding
the formation of, and allocation of competencies to, international
organizations. This debate has been particularly pointed in recent years in
the context of discussions of the competencies of the EU and the WTO."'
But we can generalize from these specific debates: Why are these
organizations created, and how should they be designed? The responses to
these questions have implications for sovereignty, for in asking what
competencies shall be accorded to international organizations, we implicitly
ask what competencies shall be left to states, and in asking how decisions
shall be made in international organizations, we ask how states may retain
131. See Katz, supra note 125 (arguing that domestic contract formation rules induce
particular forms of bargaining and affect efficiency of exchange).
132. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and hIherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 723, 743-44 (1986).
133. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 48 AM. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming Feb. 1999).
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power despite the relegation of competencies. We may ask the same
fundamental question about the international organization that Ronald Coase
asked about the business firm: Why does it exist and, if its existence is
justified, why is there not just one big one?1 4 Coase developed the theory of
the firm to answer his own question. The theory of the firm relies,
implicitly, on the Coase Theorem, which focuses attention on transaction
costs as the central determinant of the organization of production. The
choice between organizing production within the firm or organizing
production through purchases in the market, or through contract, depends on
the relative transaction costs of these alternate structures.
A. Domestic Analogies and Dissimilarities
The utility of applying the theory of the firm to international
organizations does not depend on a perfect analogy between firms and
international organizations. Nevertheless, it is useful, in considering this
analogy, to address two related questions. First, who are the real parties in
interest in international organizations-the member states or their citizens?
Second, assuming that citizens are the real parties in interest, how does the
intermediation of their national governments affect the applicability of the
theory of the firm?
While a normative contractarian, liberal, or cosmopolitan perspective
suggests that the citizens of the member states are the real parties in interest,
traditional realists would deny this. In practice, the answer ultimately
depends on the responsiveness of the relevant state government or, perhaps
more accurately, its representatives. Hence the real party in interest is
indeterminate-states are neither billiard balls nor simple conduits but, like
other institutions, complex mediating prisms that transmit the interests of
individuals at varying speeds, with varying intensities, and with varying
degrees of distortion. Because states intermediate-and since state
governments generally control the exercise of states' rights in international
organizations (subject to successful claims of a democracy deficit)-there are
important implications for the maximization that they effect. The values
maximized through transactions are not directly those of individuals, but are
the values expressed through state governments.
While corporations and international organizations have different
structures, both allocate competencies and rights to make decisions in
various ways. Indeed, as both types of bodies constitute means of
establishing artificial persons to act on behalf of constituents, it is not
surprising that they confront common issues. While the corporate
governance literature explores the problem of agency costs and conflicts of
interest-and seeks ways to ensure the fidelity of corporate managers to
134. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1973), reprinted in
RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
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shareholder welfare-public choice writings on international organizations
explore similar concerns regarding the pursuit by national governments-or
their delegates to international organizations-of their own respective
interests, rather than citizen interests.
The comparative institutional perspective suggests the desirability of
reducing these agency-type costs, but we must be mindful of the costs of
reduction and the availability of institutional substitutes. Thus, while the
corporation creates agency costs, corporations exist, Coase argued, because
the agency costs are smaller than the alternative transaction costs of the same
allocation through the market. 35 Just as economic actors may find that
integration of a production process is superior to episodic agreements, or
even long-term contracting, so states may find that they can better produce
certain goods-say, international security or expanded international trade-
by joining together in international organizations. Certainly this is the story
of the institutional development of both the EU and the WTO.'36
Obviously an international organization is not a business firm and does
not have profit maximization as a goal. The international organization's
purposes and the quality of its relationships with its constituencies are quite
different from those of a business firm. Yet the point of this Part is not that
international organizations are business firms, but that the method of
analyzing the relationships and constituencies comprising business firms can
be applied to analyze the relationships and constituencies comprising
international organizations. Even more fundamentally, international
organizations can be explained in the same currency as business firms: the
currency of comparative institutional analysis using transaction costs
economizing. 37
B. Price Theory
Traditional price theory and traditional neoclassical economics largely
ignore institutions, particularly the firm. The microeconomic perspective on
international trade has also largely ignored institutions, assuming perfect
competition and zero transaction costs.' This world of perfect competition
135. See id.
136. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470, 543-
54 (1997).
137. For a leading defense of comparative institutional analysis, see KOMESAR, supra note
21.
138. See Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, International Institutions and the New
Economics of Organization, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 (1990). Neoclassical economics has more recently
emphasized imperfect competition. See ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MARKET
STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 1 (1985).
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has no need for any institutional cooperation. But this economic perspective
ignores the cost of pursuit of the gains from trade. As pointed out by Beth
Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, neither the realist political science vision
of unmitigated conflict nor the neoclassical economics vision of a perfect
market fits the facts well.139 One does not believe institutions could help; the
other does not believe they are needed.
C. Transaction Costs and the Theory of the Firm
Given the possible gains from exchange in some circumstances, a
transaction costs focus explains institutionalization in the form of the firm,
as well as in the form of government regulation at local, national, and
international levels. It frames the problem as one of comparative institutional
analysis, considering all alternative institutions. Coase posited that people
use the market (including contract) or the firm to organize their productive
activities, depending on which produces the maximum benefits at the
minimum cost in terms of transaction costs. 4° More precisely, the "best"
organization is the one that maximizes the positive sum of transaction gains,
transaction losses, and transaction costs.
D. Operationalizing the Theory of the Firm in the Context of International
Organizations
Coase's theory of the firm has been expounded, extended, and
critiqued by a host of scholars. Much of the work has sought,
unsuccessfully, to operationalize the theory of the firm. We focus here on
the work of the leading exponent of the theory of the firm, Oliver
Williamson.
Williamson focuses on asset specificity as a basis for integration. For
Williamson, an asset specific investment is one that can only realize its full
value in the context of continued relations with another party.14" ' Such
investments may provide incentives for opportunistic behavior by the other
party after entering into economic relations. Williamson claims that asset
specificity distinguishes the market and firm models. The market works well
when asset specificity is negligible, but as asset specificity increases,
transactions are more likely to be vertically integrated than carried out in the
market.
139. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough, supra note 138.
140. See Coase, supra note 134.
141. Asset specificity may take several forms. For example, physical asset specificity may
refer to unique machinery, and human asset specificity may refer to training and skills that are not
readily transferable to alternative uses. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines:
Interpreting the 1982 Refornn, 71 CAL. L. Rv. 604, 613 (1983). Different types of asset specificity
have different ramifications for governance. See id.
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But Williamson's understanding of asset specificity is too narrow, for it
excludes otherwise indistinguishable reasons why parties might decide to
contract or enter into firms or other organizations. Williamson uses as
examples of asset specificity the worker who obtains special training that is
only useful in the employer's business. But what of the worker who declines
one job, which will not be available later, to accept another in which she is
employed at will? Perhaps the opportunity cost is also seen as an asset
specific investment, but the concept soon becomes broad enough to
encompass the giving, or giving up, of anything of value at an earlier stage,
when corresponding value has not yet been received in return. The concept
of asset specificity then becomes precisely congruent with the distinction
between market and institutions developed above: the need to bind another
person over time. Whenever this type of asset specificity exists, it may be
useful to seek an institutional solution, either in contract or in hierarchy.
Asset specificity then becomes a term for circumstances where persons
enter into relationships or transactions in which they incur costs in
disproportional amounts over time. In a very clear example, bank lending,
the bank normally provides cash to the borrower at the outset and needs an
enforceable contract to ensure that it can rely on payments of interest and
principal. In less one-sided agreements, one contract party might incur costs
earlier than the other, and therefore need to rely on the other's contractual
commitment to incur costs later. Where there is no asset specificity in this
sense, there is no need to bind the other person: no need for contract or
other institutionalization. The same is true in international relations with
respect to treaties and other institutionalization.
What makes a particular transaction in international relations "asset
specific" in the broader sense used here? Again, any transaction in which
one state advances consideration at a particular point in time and must rely
on one or more other states to carry out their end of the bargain at a later
point in time, or else experience a significant loss in its expected value, is
"asset specific." Consider, for example, recent attempts to harmonize
regulation in the EU and elsewhere. When a state modifies its domestic
regulatory system pursuant to a harmonization plan, it is difficult to reverse
this course in response to defection by another state. On the other hand, it is
relatively easy for another state to defect, and it may be difficult to identify
and evaluate defection.
Or consider an agreement to reduce trade barriers. While it could be
argued that this is the kind of self-enforcing transaction in which the
consideration can be withdrawn, reestablishing trade barriers is often
difficult. Frequently, the domestic political costs of reducing trade barriers
are incurred at the time they are reduced and cannot be fully recouped later
by reestablishment of the barriers. Moreover, to the extent that the barriers
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are reduced on a multilateral basis, withdrawal may be made more difficult
as a matter of international law, not to mention customs administration. In
addition, the entry into an international organization itself may have high
political costs, again at the outset, that are not fully recoverable. In
summary, asset specificity definitely exists in many international relations
contexts. Under circumstances of relatively high asset specificity, this
theoretical perspective predicts that states will consider entering into treaties
or other institutional relationships.
However, Williamson does not satisfactorily distinguish among various
types of institutionalization. While there is a broad continuum of "hybrid"
structures between market and hierarchy, Williamson does not establish a
predictive relationship between degree of asset specificity, on the one hand,
and type of institutionalization, on the other. Instead, he directs our attention
to three transactional features: asset specificity, uncertainty, and
frequency.142 Asset specificity, as we have seen, gives rise to potential
opportunism. In turn, this gives rise to the need for binding mechanisms or
institutions, both of which involve transaction costs. The choice of binding
mechanism depends also on the degree of uncertainty involved: the lesser the
uncertainty, the greater the ability to write specific or relatively "complete"
contracts to address any uncertainty. In contrast, increasing uncertainty and
complexity combine with "asset specificity" to make it increasingly difficult
to write complete contracts. Finally, the more frequent the transactions, the
greater economies of scale there will be in creating governance structures
that address governance needs.
Thus, asset specificity indicates the potential utility of institutions, but
does not alone indicate the kind of institutions needed. However, with higher
magnitudes of asset specificity, and with greater uncertainty and complexity,
there are greater incentives and possibilities for opportunism. More complete
contracts are required to prevent opportunism. Given positive transaction
costs, it is impossible to write explicit complete contracts. Therefore, as
asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity increase, the need to define
and transfer categories of authority to bureaucratic, legislative, or dispute
resolution-type bodies-to establish hierarchy-also increases. In other
words, greater integration is necessary. These institutional mechanisms are
needed in order to determine how standards established by the parties should
be applied in the future when particular issues arise.
From the standpoint of the history of international economic
integration, it might be theorized that states will first engage in integrative
transactions in areas characterized by low asset specificity. Once gains from
trade in low asset specificity areas are exhausted (and experience of trust is
developed), there are greater possibilities for integration in higher asset
142. See Williamson, supra note 141, at 613.
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specificity areas. From a broad standpoint, this pattern may be discerned in
the history of the WTO or European Union.
Thus far, this Part has been concerned largely with the delegation of
responsibilities to international organizations from the perspective of a
sovereign state that, until such delegation, retains plenary power. There
appears to be little difference in theory between this question and the
question of subsidiarity: Once an international organization exists, and has
plenary power (albeit cabined within limited authorizations), what powers
should it exercise at the center, and what powers should it devolve to
decentralized units? All other things being equal, the question remains,
where should responsibility be lodged?
The transaction costs approach described above is thus applicable to
the question of centralization or decentralization within an international
organization. Of course, we know that all other things are not often equal,
and the question of where plenary authority is initially lodged and how it is
transferred will often make important design differences. There is a subtle
difference between top-down designs and bottom-up designs. The less subtle
distinction, however, relates to the location of residual authority. 43
Indeed, the question of centralization versus decentralization must be
answered in tandem with the question of intergovernmentalism versus
integration. That is, as a state delegates responsibility to an international
organization, it must consider how the international organization will carry
out that responsibility in terms of centralization or decentralization. "In a
system with both centralized and decentralized decisions, the centralized
decisions serve to define the parameters of the decentralized ones and to put
constraints on the local decision makers.'"44
Finally, when authority is delegated to an international organization, it
is necessary to ask how that authority will be exercised: What is the
decision-making process within the international organization? International
143. Interestingly, from the transaction cost perspective, the location of residual authority is
somewhat blurred in both the United States federal system and the European Union. In the United
States federal system, the blur is generated by the tension between the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution and other notions of state sovereignty, on the one hand, and the Commerce Clause and
Supremacy Clause, on the other hand. In the European Union, the blur is generated by the tension
between the limited purposes of the European Union and the rather unlimited legislative authority
needed to achieve those purposes. Textually, we can look to the provisions of the Treaty on European
Union requiring subsidiarity analysis, and, for example, at the Solange opinions of the German
Constitutional Court. For a discussion of the Solange opinions, see Manfred Wiegandt, Germany's
International Integration: The Rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Maastrictht
Treaty and the Out-of-Area Deployment of German Troops, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 889
(1995). For a recent transaction cost economics approach to the relations between hierarchical levels
of government that analyzes the effects of decentralized veto power in governmental organization, see
Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. Rav. 1347,
1372-90 (1997).
144. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 114.
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organizations may reflect delegated authority, but the internal decision-
making process may, for example by, say, requiring unanimity prior to
action, recreate the "market" of international relations. Hence, there are two
types of intergovernmentalism: intergovernmentalism outside the walls of an
institution and intergovemmentalism within an institution.
In a more complex way, the possibility of a variety of internal decision
processes makes the choice between integration and intergovernmentalism a
choice along a continuum, instead of a stark binary choice. Thus, an
international organization may be accorded responsibility for a particular
issue area as a whole, while the decision-making structure preserves
intergovernmentalism in some respects and allows greater integration in
other respects. In this sense, the structure of horizontal federalism-relations
between legislatures, executives, and judiciaries-may replicate or
complement vertical federalism-relations between the center and the
components.
E. Game Theory
Just as our understanding of property and contract are informed by the
study of strategic interaction, so is the analysis of the firm extended by game
theoretic analysis. Game theory may provide insight into horizontal strategic
interaction among states that are parties to an international organization, as
well as into that occurring vertically between the states and the international
organization itself.145 Game theory has been applied to decision-making
within the European Union, generating some interesting insights.146
145. See generally MASAHIKO AOu, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984)
(refining the theory of the firm structure based on cooperative decision-making between all three
players-shareholders, managers, and employees); GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HmRARCHY (1992) (using political economy as a bridge between mechanistic
and organic models of hierarchy and defending the revived importance of leadership ability in
managers); Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of
Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991) (revisiting the central assumptions of
bankruptcy scholarship in situations involving two players negotiating shares during a reorganization);
William Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (exploring how game theory
has prompted a rethinking of the organization of economic institutions and corporate governance);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1495 (1990) (injecting the role of shareholders as a third player in the traditional shareholder-
manager agency framework, and translating the "series of bargaining" portrayal into a "series of
coalitions" view); Harvey Leibenstein, The Prisoners' Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of
Intrafirm Productivity, 72 AM. EcON. REv. 92 (1982) (describing productivity as a prisoners'
dilermna bargain between employees and managers solved by shocks rather than the invisible hand);
Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 285 (1991)
(drawing links between legal understanding and game theory); Manuel A. Utset, Toward a Bargaining
Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 540 (1995) (focusing on the strategic bargaining of the
shareholder-manager relationship while removing certain assumptions of traditional agency theory).
146. See generally Robert Cooter & Josef Drexel, The Logic of Power in the Emerging
European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 307
(1994) (describing power sharing between the European Community's Council of Ministers,
Parliament, Court of Justice, and Commission); Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons
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The strategic perspective rejects the assumption that principals and
agents-e.g., states and international organizations-have a joint goal of
reducing transaction costs or of reaching efficient outcomes. As Bratton
writes, "Even in a costless environment, information asymmetries may
cause parties to fail to bargain their way to an efficient term." 47 Rather,
each seeks to maximize its own outcomes regardless of the cost to the other.
The prisoners' dilemma is one game theoretic model for this bargaining
context.1 48 The prisoners' dilemma has been used by a number of legal
scholars to depict the decision of states to comply with trade liberalization or
to defect from liberal trade policies. 149 Many scholars conclude on this basis
that despite the fact that states could maximize their welfare by compliance,
they will defect. Interestingly, the prisoners' dilemma assumes that the
players may not speak to or bind one another. Institutions and law may be
explained as an attempt to overcome the prisoners' dilemma by providing
mechanisms for communication and commitment.
VII. LIMITATIONS ON THE UTILITY OF EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
This is not the place to provide a general critique of L&E. 15 ° On
balance, we believe that, while it is critical to identify the limitations of
economic analysis, L&E methods provide extremely useful tools. However,
we do not claim that L&E is invariably the best approach to every single
from German Federalism and European Integration, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 239 (1988) (comparing
institutional arrangements, bargaining, and decision-making dynamics in the German federalist system
and the European Union).
147. Bratton, supra note 145, at 153.
148. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY (James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds., 1990); cf. Utset, supra note 145,
at 569 (analyzing the firm as a bargaining game between shareholders and managers).
149. For a critique of the prisoners' dilemma model in the trade context, see Dunoff, supra
note 133.
150. A "technical" critique argues that legal analysis is invariably flawed by measurement
problems, such as the problem of accurately assigning shadow prices to "goods" not traded in markets
(or the "offer/asking" problem). A "distributional" critique notes L&E's emphasis on efficiency, to
the exclusion of important questions of equity in distribution. For representative articulations of these
critiques, see MARK KELMAN, A GuIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987), which reviews critical
legal studies critiques of L&E; Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics and the Problem of Legal
Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, which outlines limits of L&E in addressing both positive and normative
questions; Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981),
which argues that the "offer/asking" problem renders cost-benefit analysis indeterminate; and Arthur
Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974),
which asserts that L&E ignores distributional and other normative issues, A number of legal scholars
have also articulated a "moral" critique of the economic analysis of law. See generally Jane B. Baron
& Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal
Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. RV. 431 (1996) (discussing this critique as articulated in various areas of
domestic law).
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legal problem, or that L&E can answer every single question. In particular,
while L&E methods may be very helpful in identifying ways to achieve
particular policy objectives, they may not be particularly helpful in
identifying these objectives in the first place. Moreover, in many contexts
L&E methodologies may appear to lack critical bite, as they will "simply"
validate existing legal rules or institutions, or reinforce insights generated by
other scholarly methodologies."' However, we believe that such analyses
are still valuable, as they can provide novel explanations of existing rules or
institutions and can provide counterintuitive insights into existing doctrines.
Finally, such analyses can illuminate the limitations of more traditional legal
tools and the circumstances under which they might not be persuasive.
While these comments are equally applicable to the domestic and
international realms, in this Part we outline a number of ways in which
economic analysis may be especially problematic in the international legal
field.1' Hence, just as law and economics provides a powerful new tool to
enrich our understanding of international law, the international legal order
poses a new set of challenges that can enrich our understanding of law and
economics.
We focus on three areas that seem to raise greater concerns in the
international legal context. All three have been prominent in domestic
critiques of law and economics, but we believe that they become more
powerful when considered in relation to international law. In turn, their
application to international law exaggerates and highlights concerns raised in
the domestic sphere. The issues we address here are the constructed nature
of the rules sometimes considered to be background assumptions, the
problem of interpersonal (and interstate) comparisons of utility, and the
problem of incommensurable values.
A. The Contingent Nature of Background Norms
Much L&E analysis of domestic law, either alone or combined with
public choice analysis, is used to argue against most forms of government
regulation of commercial activity. We think this may often result from the
choice of research agenda and the methods of the researchers, and may
reflect a policy prejudice that is not necessitated by L&E itself.
Interestingly, however, this style of law and economics does not reject
contract or property law. But, as the international system highlights, it is
clear (as realists and critical legal scholars have long argued) that contract
and property are as constructed, and as "regulatory," as taxation, securities
151. For more on this "reinforcing" role of L&E scholarship, see Johnston, supra note 4;
and David Skeel, Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Scholarship, 50 VAND. L.
R v. 647, 665 (1997).
152. We recognize that these problems also inhere in the L&E analysis of domestic legal
issues and address this point, where appropriate, in the discussion below.
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regulation and antitrust law.'53 This observation seems sufficient to refute a
claim often associated with Chicago School law and economics analysts: that
regulatory law beyond the common law should be eliminated, reverting to a
supposed nirvana of freedom of contract.
The international legal system provides a more graphic illustration of
the contingent nature of contract and property than does the domestic
system. Compared to the domestic system, the international legal system
lacks cognates to the more complete domestic systems of property law
(territory and jurisdiction), contract (treaty and custom), and tort (state
responsibility for harm to others).' 4
Hence, we might begin to inquire as to the reasons behind the modest
binding nature of the international legal order compared to the domestic
legal order.'55 And would conventional law and economics analysts declare
this attenuated nature efficient? If property and contract are the background
of any well-functioning system for mutually beneficial exchange, why are
they so rudimentary in the international legal system? While we begin to
address these questions above, further economic analysis should provide
additional insights into the relatively rudimentary structure of the
international legal system.
One way to approach the international legal system, sympathetic to law
and economics tools, is as a system where the social contractarian, and
constructed, nature of law is more readily apparent. In this world stripped to
a more fundamental social contract, there is little reason to argue that we
should stop constructing rules once we have finished constructing treaty law
or the law of jurisdiction-the cognates of contract and property. Rather, as
shown above, the regulatory and distributive character of these rules is
revealed, undermining arguments that they are somehow natural or that they
are the appropriate stopping places for the state's activities. This social
contracting process has no "natural" beginning or end in either domestic or
international society.
B. Valuing Trade-Offs: The Problem of Interstate Comparison of Utility
In addition, the international legal order highlights the real problem
with the method of efficiency analysis often used in law and economics
analysis. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis, also known as potential Pareto
efficiency analysis, and equivalent to cost-benefit analysis, inquires whether
153. See generally Dunoff, supra note 133.
154. Of course, the combination of the rule and the institutional support for the rule must be
analyzed to assess its social effects, and here, while international law exists and has social effects, it is
significantly less effective than most domestic law.
155. See Stephan, supra note 72 (adducing arguments for retaining national control over
international institutions).
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a change would make someone better off without making anyone else worse
off, assuming the ability to compensate others for harm.156 That is, it
inquires whether the change would create a sufficient surplus to compensate
those harmed. In order to make this inquiry, Kaldor-Hicks must determine
the value to those harmed of the injury imposed upon them; this
determination requires that the analyst set the value to the harmed person of
the injury.
But the very possibility of such interpersonal comparisons of utility
have bedeviled economic theory, and there is no widely accepted method for
determining the value of a harm (or benefit) to another. In fact the answer to
this problem is a call to comparative institutional analysis: the best we can
do in cost-benefit analysis is to devise institutions that seem to reflect, as
well as possible, constituent utility. Here again, the market competes with
legislatures and courts as institutions devised to engage in interpersonal
comparison of utility. Economists generally believe that decisions made in
the market are actually Pareto-efficient, in accordance with the principle of
consumer sovereignty, as the consumer contracting willingly is in the best
position to know when she is better off.
However, this perspective elides the more fundamental question of
whether these issues are best addressed by the market or instead by other
institutions, as each type of institution entails both transaction costs and
strategic costs. From the standpoint of Pareto analysis of institutions, what
makes these institutions satisfactory is that they are accepted, again in a
social contractarian sense. As legal analysts, we can only seek to add light to
the determination of which institution to use.
In the domestic system, we assume a high degree of social solidarity.
One facet of this solidarity may be the willingness to accord to institutions,
such as legislatures, courts, and the market, the authority to make
allocational decisions. In international society, this solidarity may be less
firm: there is less of a sense of shared values, and less of a sense of being
willing to accept the costs of an adverse decision in the short run for the
benefits of living in society-and later receiving favorable decisions-in the
long run. 7 There is less of a sense of living in a constitutional moment,
with a limited Rawlsian veil of ignorance, that allows acceptance of
constitutional rules. 5 Part of the reason for this lack of solidarity is the
156. The seminal articles setting forth this analysis include J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Analysis, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); and Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics,
49 EcON. J. 549 (1939).
157. For a review of the concept of solidarity in international legal discourse, see Ronald St.
J. McDonald, Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International Law, 8 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 259 (1996).
158. Rawls discusses a hypothetical veil of ignorance, in which people can make distributive
decisions regarding the relative allocations to the wealthy and the poor without knowing their actual
place in society. This is a mechanism for thinking about and legitimating distributive outcomes. To a
limited extent, the agreement of constitutional rules takes place under ignorance-ignorance of how
the rule will affect individuals-and this fact allows individuals to agree to constitutional rules that
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relative thinness of the international system noted above: fewer transactions
means fewer opportunities for things to work out in the long run.
C. The Incommensurability of Diverse Social Goods
Much of the analysis above presupposes the ability to measure and
compare the "costs" and "benefits" of various types of transactions and
institutional frameworks. But this assumption masks several difficulties.
First, as noted above, the lack of a monetized market for the "goods" at
issue in interstate transactions-such as jurisdictional authority,
environmental amenities, and national security-significantly complicates all
attempts at measurement. More importantly, many argue that it is not
possible to reduce all relevant considerations into a single metric, assign
them quantitative values, and weigh them against each other as if on a scale.
This is the incommensurability thesis. 59
This thesis has several variants, all of which are potentially applicable
to the economic analysis of international law. One variant of the
incommensurability thesis is that to ask for the economic value of certain
social goods is to make a category error, like asking, what color is the
square root of one?16 Another variant is that, while it may be possible to
calculate economic trade-offs between different goods, to understand trade-
offs simply in economic terms is to "do violence" to our understandings of
these goods. 6 Another variant is that by comparing diverse goods in
economic terms we transform our understanding of these goods in
objectionable ways; we commodify these goods and thereby debase them.'
Each of these critiques of economic analysis raises serious issues.
Again, however, we see these issues as problems to be solved, rather than as
reasons to abandon the economic analysis of international law. For example,
the thinness of international legal rules and institutions should be the starting
point of analysis, rather than a stopping point; it suggests a rich research
agenda. Similarly, if the "goods" valued by the international community are
commensurable in certain respects but incommensurable in other respects,
might in the future impose a detriment on them. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42
(1971).
159. For more on incommensurability in the domestic context, see Baron & Dunoff, supra
note 150; and Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. RaV. 779
(1994) (stating that rational decisions cannot be made when measuring goods with social and personal
values that do not always have commensurable relationships).
160. See Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 1393,
1411 (1981).
161. See Sunstein, supra note 159, at 797.
162. For example, if babies or body parts were routinely bought and sold, we might begin to
think of people as nothing more than commodities. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1850 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 159, at 797. This "moral" dimension of
the use of economic analysis is analyzed in Baron & Dunoff, supra note 150, at 447-51, 470-71.
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this raises the fundamental question of what is the appropriate measuring
rod? We believe that-as in the domestic sphere-further work on these
issues will illuminate not only the international legal order, but also the
appropriate domain of economic analysis of law.
VIII. TOWARD A RESEARCH PROGRAM IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Elements of a Progressive Research Program in International Law
Imre Lakatos noted that scholarship tends to proceed by constructing a
research program.'63 A research program in Lakatos's terms includes a hard
core, such as assumptions of rationality and methodological individualism.
This is then used to generate auxiliary hypotheses, such as some of those
discussed above regarding jurisdiction, treaty, and organization. A
progressive research program is one that is able to adapt its auxiliary
hypotheses as it confronts anomalies. With this Article, we seek to expand
theoretical discourse in international law scholarship, and to suggest the
possibility of a progressive international law research program. Our ultimate
goal, of course, is to stimulate research that will expand the boundaries of
our knowledge of the international legal system. Working within the
suggested research program, a scholar could identify an international legal
problem and use the theoretical perspectives of law and economics to
generate a hypothesis. If this is an operational theory, then the hypothesis
could be empirically tested.
Here again, we point toward comparative institutional analysis. For the
lawyer's laboratory is not simply the library, but it is the world of
institutional contingency. We can compare actual institutional structures in
place, or compare actual institutions with hypothetical ones. To be sure,
comparison is difficult given the number of variables to account for, but
there is little alternative.
Our expectation is that, once a more refined body of theory is
developed through greater theorizing and empirical testing, this research
program may progress. Scholars utilizing law and economics in international
law can build "a chain of ever more complicated models simulating
reality,"" rather than continually rehashing the same inconclusive
arguments. In this regard, we understand our proposed research program as
a cooperative endeavor, in which scholars build upon the work of others,
together building an edifice of greater knowledge. This endeavor will
require great coordination and modesty, in which scholars understand and
agree on the next steps in building the edifice.
163. See IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHOLODOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 47-52
(John Worell & Gregory Cerrie eds., 1978).
164. Lakatos, supra note 4, at 50.
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We have mentioned above a number of international law subjects that
could be addressed using law and economics. In fact, we believe that almost
every international law research subject could be illuminated, to some
degree, by these research methods. Below, we very briefly list a few
additional applications, by way of additional illustration. This list is by no
means exhaustive.
B. Positive Political Theory and Transnationalism
Positive political theory may be extremely relevant to the institutional
issues that interest international lawyers and scholars. This approach uses
game theoretic concepts to explore relationships among various institutions.
It directs our attention to the strategic interactions among different bodies
and is thus a useful vehicle for the investigation of dynamic, rather than
static, systems. On the domestic level, positive political theory has been
used to explore, for example, the strategic interactions among Congress,
administrative bodies, and the courts. While the tools and analysis of
positive political theory have not been applied extensively to international
law, 6' we believe this analysis may inform the increasingly important focus
on inter-institutional interactions, as explored in the recent writings of
scholars such as Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter.'66
While Koh and Slaughter often explore the international legal
implications of interactions among domestic institutions, we believe that
positive political economy may well shed light on interactions among
international institutions. One possible area of focus would be on the
interactions among particular types of international bodies; for example,
how might we expect the legal and policy issues arising from the recent and
165. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Michael S. Knoll, The Economics of "Injury" in
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, supra note 2 at 126
(applying positive political theory tools to the antidumping law context); Ronald A. Cass & Warren F.
Schwartz, Causality and Coherence in Administration of International Trade Laws, in FAIR
EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS (Michael Trebilcock & Robert York eds., 1990)
(same).
166. See, e.g., Koh, Legal Process, supra note 75 (describing the role of institutional
interactions in norm enunciation); Koh, Nations Obey, supra note 75 (arguing that transnational
actors' international legal obligations become internally binding after they have been incorporated into
the domestic legal system); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183
(Sept./Oct.,1997) ("The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into separate, functionally
distinct parties. These parties-courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are
networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new,
transgovernmental order."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29
U. RIcH. L. Rv. 99 (1994) (discussing various forms of transjudicial communication-
communication among courts across borders); see also Symposium, The Interaction Between National
Courts and International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1996) (discussing international
law in national courts, national jurisprudence in international tribunals, and the discourse that results
among the two types of fora).
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rapid increase in the number of international adjudicatory fora to be
resolved? 67 Another possible area of inquiry would be the interactions
among international organizations that share responsibility for a particular
issue area; for example, how will the WTO and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) interact over intellectual property issues? Or,
how do the OECD and regional trade organizations change their behavior
when they are simultaneously working on, for example, international
investment issues? What are the dynamics when UNIDROIT and
UNCITRAL are simultaneously drafting comparable treaty regimes?
Alternatively, positive political theory could inform research into
interactions among different bodies within the same international
organization, for example the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice, or the Security Council and the International Court of
Justice. While international legal scholars have begun to explore these types
of issues, we believe that the proliferation of international bodies makes this
likely to be a particularly fruitful area of inquiry.
C. Norms and Customary International Law
Law and economics scholars have recently turned their attention to
"norms," the rules and practices that govern relations in private groups.168
Much of the debate concerns whether and when norms created by private
groups are likely to be efficient, and whether and when the state should
either incorporate these norms into positive law or defer to these norms in a
dispute resolution context. Some have analogized lawmaking to state
economic planning, and norms to the market.16 9 Others are more skeptical,
pointing to externalities, strategic behavior, imperfect information, and other
reasons why private norms will often be inefficient. 17
0
The norms literature typically identifies several features that distinguish
"norms" from "law." Significantly, while law is the product of centralized,
hierarchical bodies (legislatures and courts), norms arise out of a
decentralized process involving horizontally situated actors. Similarly, while
law is enforced through centralized, hierarchical bodies, norms are enforced
167. See, e.g., Jonathan Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute
Settlement Systems, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (1996) (urging "competition" among international
tribunals and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)); Shigeru Oda, The International Court of Justice
Viewed from the Bench, 244 RECUEIL DES COORS 9, 139-55 (1993) (arguing that multiple fora detract
from the role of the ICJ).
168. For an introduction to the literature, see Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996).
169. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1644-46 (1996).
170. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697
(1996). For a comment on the Cooter and Posner papers, arguing that law and economics scholars
have overemphasized questions of comparative institutional competence and underemphasized study of
the substantive solution of particular problems, see Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745 (1996).
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through nonlegal, decentralized mechanisms. In particular, it appears that
norms are often obeyed when they become "internalized," or as a result of
reputational concerns.'71 Hence, it would appear that norms share a number
of features with international law, and we believe that L&E analysis of
norms might fruitfully be extended to the international arena.
Interestingly, one of the leading L&E scholars of "norms," Eric
Posner, has recently co-authored an article on customary international law
that analyzes custom from a game theoretic perspective.'72 While this game
theoretic approach to custom is fully consistent with our call for L&E
analyses of international legal issues, we hope that those interested in norms
might also begin to explore issues such as (1) the conditions under which we
might expect customary norms to serve broader community interests, (2)
when customary norms might be preferable to treaty, and (3) various
strategies for dealing with the breach of customary norms.
D. Regulatory Competition-Regulatory Jurisdiction
Regulatory competition has become an important issue in international
relations, despite small amount of data showing that such competition
actually occurs. There is a growing law and economics literature addressing
regulatory competition, increasingly linked to the issue of regulatory
jurisdiction. This literature began in U.S. domestic analysis of fiscal
competition (utilizing the Tiebout theorem17a) has addressed the "Delaware
phenomenon" in U.S. corporate law,'74 and is beginning to address
171. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (outlining an "esteem" theory to describe the origin and enforcement of
norms, where "esteem" turns, in part, on individuals caring about how they are perceived by others);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996). Some of the early
scholarship on norms emphasized their importance in underdeveloped legal systems. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and
Contract Law, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 15 (1984) (developing a theory on the relationship between
the size of trading groups and the development of the contract law and concluding that socially
efficient trading groups are smaller than the free entry trading group and larger than the monopoly
trading group); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Lmv, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (developing a theory of the
ethnically homogenous middleman group in the context of an exchange economy characterized by
contract uncertainty).
172. See Eric Posner & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv.
(forthcoming Fall 1999).
173. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (explaining that the amount and quality of local provision of public goods and services can be
explained by a theory of inter-jurisdictional competition that closely resembles market competition for
the provision of private goods and services).
174. There is strong disagreement as to whether the "Delaware phenomenon"-the
surprisingly large number of corporations that incorporate or reincorporate under the laws of the State
of Delaware-represents a "race to the bottom" among states competing for incorporation franchises
or a "race to the top" for efficient corporation laws that permit maximum returns to investors. For a
recent review of the literature, see Lucian A. Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The
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international regulatory competition. 17 5 As we note below, some of these
themes are beginning to appear in international environmental law
scholarship, and we believe that they could usefully be applied to other areas
as well.
E. Fiscal Federalism-International Organizations
The fiscal federalism literature addresses how to distribute
responsibilities among different levels of government. The general argument
is that government services should be provided by the smallest jurisdiction
that encompasses the geographical expanse of the benefits and costs
associated with the service. Under this approach, all the relevant costs and
benefits are internalized. In addition, this approach permits the tailoring of
service levels to the particular tastes and other circumstances found in
individual jurisdictions. The underlying idea is that, instead of providing a
uniform level of public outputs over a large area, social welfare can be
increased by differentiating these outputs according to local preferences and
conditions. 176
The literature of fiscal federalism is only beginning to be imported
from economics to law. It has been applied to many issues related to the EU,
including the principle of subsidiarity and the European Monetary Union. 77
This literature shows promise for application to international legal issues of
coordination among governments not only in the tax area, but in other
regulatory fields. It may also shed light on the difficulties surrounding the
powers and competencies afforded international organizations, as discussed
above.
F. Domestic Environmental Law-International Environmental Law
Law and economics analysis has been very influential in domestic
environmental discourse. These economic arguments are increasingly being
used in various international environmental law contexts. For example, the
law and economics critique of "command and control" legislation has helped
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1437 (1992).
175. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993).
176. See generally WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 35 (1972) (stating that, for a
public good, "it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local government to provide
the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to
provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions"); Wallace Oates, On
Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1321, 1322-23 (1997) (stating that the basic principles of
fiscal federalism suggest that governments take full advantage of tailoring service levels to the
particular tastes that characterize these local jurisdictions).
177. See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the
New European Community: An Issue for Economic Federalism, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 147 (1994)
(stating that the European Community often uses the concept of subsidiarity to determine whether a
policy-making function should be centralized or decentralized).
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prompt significant changes in the structure of domestic environmental
statutes. Similar effects are starting to emerge in the international context, as
evidenced by the various "market mechanisms" included in the recently
concluded Kyoto Protocol. '78 Economic rhetoric has also entered
International Court of Justice opinions on international environmental
matters.' 
79
Economic analysis can also be helpful in clarifying the very
justifications for international environmental law. At times, these rules are
justified by fears of a "race to the bottom," in which states would compete
for investment and industry by progressively lowering their environmental
standards.'80 The robust debate over the "race to the bottom" theory in the
domestic context'8 ' has started to spill over into the international domain.
Significantly, this debate has paid careful attention to the similarities and
differences between domestic and international legal systems. 8 2 We also
believe that public choice and other L&E methodologies that have been
178. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998). For an analysis of this treaty, see Clare
Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998); Laura B. Campbell & Chad W. Carpenter, From Kyoto to
Buenos Aires: Implementing the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 748
(July 22, 1998).
179. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 383
(Sept. 22) (opinion of Judge ad hoc Palmer).
180. This rationale was likewise an important argument in favor of federal environmental law
in the 1970s. The classic articulation of this rationale is Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice:
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
181. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a
"Race" and Is It "to the Bottom?", 48 HASTnqGs L.J. 271, 351-59 (1997) (arguing, on the basis of
empirical surveys, that states compete for industry by lowering environmental standards); Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 627-38 (1996) (arguing that
unique qualities of environmental issues make interstate competition likely to be welfare-reducing
rather than efficient); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992)
(providing theoretical critique of "race-to-the-bottom" justifications for federal environmental laws);
Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Erplaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y Rev. 67 (1996) (arguing that
competition among states will likely produce suboptimal results).
182. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1283 (1997) (arguing that environmental regimes have evolved in parallel ways in the United
States, the European Union, and international communities); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA.
L. REv. 1331 (1997) (arguing that agreements of centralized intervention and environmental
regulation are different for the international community as compared to federal systems). For more on
the "race to the bottom" debate in the international context, discussing various empirical studies on
"race to the bottom" phenomena, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Understanding Asia's Economic and
Environmental Crises, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (1999).
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influential in the domestic realm will likewise prove fruitful in the
international context.'
G. Comparative Law/Law and Development/Harmonization-Comparative
Institutional Analysis
Comparative law has suffered to an even. greater degree than
international law from lack of a theoretical and methodological base. The
new institutional economics, with its emphasis on comparative institutional
analysis, is a natural source of theory and methodology for comparative law.
This approach may be applied to today's two leading uses for comparative
law: structuring laws for emerging and developing countries'84 and the
analysis of various national legal regimes' movement toward harmonization.
IX. CONCLUSION
While law and economics methodologies have informed our
understanding of many areas of domestic law, they have been underutilized
in international legal scholarship. We have attempted to explain why this is
so, and to explore the uses-and limitations-of economic analysis of
international law. In particular, we have attempted to show why the new
institutional economics, incorporating the more standard neoclassical tool of
price theory-as well as game theory and transaction cost economics-shows
particular promise.
We recognize that many of our arguments and examples are illustrative
rather than exhaustive. But our purpose in writing this Article was to present
a first-rather than the last-word on these issues. We believe we have
demonstrated the utility of L&E methods in analyzing a variety of
international legal topics, and invite others to join in a progressive research
program. Our larger hope is that by enlarging the theoretical tools at our
disposal, the use of L&E methodologies will enrich international legal
discourse and scholarship.
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